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This article is part of a symposium on "Migration Regulation Goes Local: The Role of 
States in U.S. Immigration Policy." Although only time will tell, September 11, 2001 
promises to be a watershed in the history of the United States. Not long after the tragedy, 
supporters and critics alike saw the federal government as "pushing the envelope" in 
restricting civil liberties in the name of national security. This article analyzes the nation's 
response to the horrific loss of life of September 11 and shows how the centralization of 
immigration power in the hands of the federal government, may exacerbate the civil 
rights impacts of the enforcement of the immigration laws. The federal government has 
acted more swiftly and uniformly than the states ever could, with severe consequences for 
the Arab and Muslim community in the United States. That the reaction was federal in 
nature - and thus national in scope as well as uniform in design and impact, and with 
precious few legal constraints - worsened the civil rights impacts.  
The civil rights deprivations resulting from federal action reveals that national regulation 
of immigration is a double-edged sword. Although federal law pre-empts state laws 
designed to regulate immigration or discriminate against aliens, it can also, with few legal 
constraints, strike out at immigrants across the nation if it sees fit. That in turn suggests 
that the role of states, as well as the federal government, in the regulation of immigration 
and immigrants, especially in times of national crisis, deserves most serious attention.  
The federal government's response to September 11 also demonstrates the close 
relationship between immigration law and civil rights in the United States. Noncitizens 
historically have been the most vulnerable to civil rights deprivations, in large part 
because the law permits, perhaps even encourages, extreme governmental conduct with 
minimal protections for the rights of noncitizens. Unfortunately, the current backlash 
against Arabs and Muslims in the United States fits comfortably into a long nativist 
history.  
In sum, a complex matrix of "otherness" based on race, national origin, religion, and 
political ideology contributes to the current attacks on the civil rights of Arabs and 
Muslims in the United States. As has occurred in the past, the ripple effects of national 
security measures in the end may adversely affect the legal rights of all noncitizens, not 
just Arabs and Muslims. Indeed, as we contend in this article, the civil rights deprivations 
resulting from the war on terrorism may have long term adverse impacts on the civil 
rights of citizens as well as noncitizens in the United States.  
To help us better understand the latest "war on terrorism," Part I of the Article analyzes 
the general demonization of Arabs and Muslims generally in the United States and how 
the law has been influenced by, and reinforced, the negative stereotypes. This section 
reviews the federal government's actions directed at Arabs and Muslims in the name of 
combating terrorism well before September 11. As Professor Edward Said has observed, 
terrorism in these times "has displaced Communism as public enemy number one." That 
has translated into a near exclusive focus on "foreign terrorists," particularly Arabs and 
Muslims. Part II studies the federal government's zealous investigatory methods after 
September 11 directed at Muslim and Arab noncitizens, with disregard for their civil 
rights, and the possible long term impacts of that response.  
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Although only time will tell, September 11, 2001 promises to 
be a watershed in the history of the United States.  After the 
tragic events of that morning, including the hijacking of three 
commercial airliners subsequently used as weapons of mass 
destruction,1 America went to war on many fronts, including but 
not limited to military action in Afghanistan.2  As needed and 
expected, heightened security and an intense criminal 
investigation followed.  Moreover, almost immediately after the 
tragedy, Arabs and Muslims, as well as those appearing to be 
Arab or Muslim, were subject to crude forms of racial profiling.3 
 Airlines removed Arab and Muslim passengers, including a Secret 
Service agent assigned to protect President Bush, from an 
airplane for making the flight crew uncomfortable.4  Hate 
crimes against Arabs, Muslims, and others rose precipitously.5  
                     
1 See Serge Schmemann, U.S. Attacked; President Vows to 
Exact Punishment for `Evil, N.Y. TIMES, Sept 12, 2001, at A1. 
2 Congress, however, did not formally declare war, which 
allows the President expansive powers over alien enemies under 
the Alien Enemy Act of 1798.  See J. Gregory Sidak, War, Liberty, 
and Enemy Aliens, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1402 (1992).  Thus, many of 
the security measures adopted by the federal government, see 
infra text accompanying notes __, cannot be said to have been 
authorized by Congress. 
3 See infra text accompanying notes ___. 
4 See Guard for Bush Isnt Allowed Aboard Flight, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 27, 2001, at B5; Ken Ellingwood & Nicholas Riccardi, 
Arab Americans Enduring Hard Stares of Other Fliers, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 20, 2001, at A1; Phillip Morris, Racial Profiling Has a New 
Target, PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 25, 2001, at B9.  In response to early 
reports of discrimination against Arab and Muslim appearing 
people, the Department of Transportation issued a Policy 
Statement emphasizing that a person cannot be disparately treated 
solely based on national origin or religion.  See U.S. Dept of 
Transportation, Carrying out Transportation Inspection and Safety 
Responsibilities in a Nondiscriminatory Manner, Oct. 17, 2001 
(www.dot.gov/airconsumer/OGCreminder1./htm).  
5 See Laurie Goodstein & Tamar Lewin, Victims of Mistaken 
Identity, Sikhs Pay a Price for Turbans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 
2001, at A1; Tamar Lewin & Gustav Niebuhr, Attacks and Harassment 
on Middle Eastern People and Mosques, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2001, 
at B5; see also Bill Ong Hing, Vigilante Racism: The De-
Americanization and Subordination of Immigrant America, 
unpublished manuscript on file with authors (documenting hate 
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In Arizona, a U.S. citizen claiming vengeance for his country 
killed a Sikh immigrant from India based on the mistaken belief 
that this turban-wearing, bearded man was Arab.6 
 
                                                                  
crimes against Muslims after September 11 and tying this period 
into historical antecedents); 147 CONG. REC. E2150 (Nov. 28, 2001) 
(Rep. Conyers) (stating that, from September 11 to November 28, 
2001 American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee had investigated 
over 450 hate crimes); 147 CONG. REC. H8174, 8174-75 (Nov. 14, 
2001) (Rep. Woolsey) (recounting statistical data showing 
precipitous rise in hate crimes against Muslims and Arabs after 
September 11).  The Council on American-Islamic Relations 
reported nearly one thousand anti-Arab, Muslim incidents around 
the country between September 11 and October 22, 2001.  See 
http://www.cair-net.org.  By the end of October, 2001, the 
Department of Justice was investigating over 250 hate crimes 
against Arabs and Muslims nationwide.  See 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/legalinfo/discrimupdate.ht (Jan. 21, 
2002); Author Conversations in Oct. 2001 with Casey Stavropoulos 
and Dan Nelson, U.S. Dept of Justice, Civil Rights Section, 
Public Information Div. 
6 See Goldstein & Lewin, supra note _; Richard Serrano, 
Assaulting Against Muslims, Arabs Escalating, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 
28, 2001, at A1. 
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Not long after the tragedy, supporters and critics alike saw 
the federal government as pushing the envelope in restricting 
civil liberties in the name of national security.6  Other 
contributions to this symposium analyze the devolution of 
immigration regulation from the federal government to the 
states.7  This article analyzes the nations response to the 
horrific loss of life of September 11 and shows how the 
centralization of immigration power in the hands of the federal 
government, may exacerbate the civil rights impacts of the 
                     
6 See Christian Berg, Thornburgh: Bush Doing Just Fine, 
MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pennsylvania), Nov. 16, 2001, at A4 
(quoting former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh); J.M. 
Lawrence, Civil Rights Advocates Wary About the Future, BOSTON 
HERALD, Sept. 28, 2001, at 34 (reporting concerns of civil rights 
advocates that federal government might have popular support to 
push the envelope on infringing on civil liberties). 
7 See, e.g., Victor C. Romero, Devolution and 
Discrimination, 58 ANN. SURVEY AM. LAW (forthcoming 2002); CITE TO 
OTHER SYMPOSIUM PAPERS ON THIS TOPIC.  The proper role, if any, 
for the states in immigration enforcement has emerged as an issue 
of academic commentary.  Compare Peter J. Spiro, The States and 
Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INTL L. 
131 (1994) [hereinafter Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties] (contending 
that states should have increased role in immigration matters); 
Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live With Immigration Federalism, 29 
CONN. L. REV. 1627 (1997) (analyzing states new power over 
defining benefit eligibility for aliens in 1996 welfare reform 
law), with Michael A. Olivas, Preempting Preemption: Foreign 
Affairs, State Rights, and Alienage Classifications, 35 VA. J. 
INTL L. 217 (1994) (challenging Spiros argument and defending 
federal pre-emption of state efforts to regulate immigration); 
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism and 
Proposition 187, 35 VA. J. INTL L. 201 (1994) (questioning 
Spiros thesis on grounds that the federal government should play 
central role in formation of immigrants national identity); 
Peter H. Schuck & John Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens: The 
Pitfalls and Promises of Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 367 
(1999) (analyzing difficulties of federal government working with 
state and local agencies in the deportation of criminal aliens 
and analyzing potential for creation of better working 
relationship); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry?  
Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection and 
Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001) (criticizing devolution 




enforcement of the immigration laws.  The federal government has 
acted more swiftly and uniformly than the states ever could, with 
severe consequences for the Arab and Muslim community in the 
United States.  That the reaction was federal in nature  and 
thus national in scope as well as uniform in design and impact, 
and with precious few legal constraints8 -- worsened the civil 
rights impacts. 
 
The civil rights deprivations resulting from federal action 
reveals that national regulation of immigration is a double-edged 
sword.  Although federal law pre-empts state laws designed to 
regulate immigration or discriminate against aliens,9 it can 
also, with few legal constraints, strike out at immigrants across 
the nation if it sees fit.  That in turn suggests that the role 
of states, as well as the federal government, in the regulation 
of immigration and immigrants, especially in times of national 
crisis, deserves most serious attention.   
 
                     
8 See infra text accompanying notes __. 
9 See, e.g., Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commn, 
334 U.S. 410 (1948); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); 
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 
755 (1995).  In 1996 reforms to the immigration laws, see infra 
text accompanying notes __, Congress afforded state and local 
governments greater powers to assist the federal government in 
the enforcement of the immigration laws, which has raised civil 
rights concerns.  See Jay T. Jorgensen, The Practical Power of 
State and Local Governments to Enforce Federal Immigration Laws, 
1997 B.Y.U. L. REV. 899. 
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The federal governments response to September 11 also 
demonstrates the close relationship between immigration law and 
civil rights in the United States.  Noncitizens historically have 
been the most vulnerable to civil rights deprivations, in no 
small part because the law permits, and perhaps even encourages, 
extreme governmental conduct with minimal protections for the 
rights of noncitizens.10  Unfortunately, the current backlash 
against Arabs and Muslims in the United States fits comfortably 
into a long nativist history, including the Alien and Sedition 
Act of the 1790s, the Palmer Raids and the Red Scare that 
followed World War I, and other concerted efforts by the U.S. 
government to stifle political dissent.11  This historical moment 
is especially troubling because, reminiscent of the Japanese 
internment during World War II,12 perceived racial, coupled with 
religious and other, difference amplifies the animosity toward 
                     
10 See infra text accompanying notes ___. 
11 See Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act, The 
Immigration Reform Act, and Ideological Regulation in the 
Immigration Laws:  Important Lessons For Citizens and 
Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 833, 841-69 (1997) [hereinafter 
Johnson, Antiterrorism]; see also Victor C. Romero, On Elian and 
Aliens: A Political Solution to the Plenary Power Problem, 4 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POLY 343, 359-62 (2000/01) (contending that 
Supreme Courts deference to Congress and Executive Branch in 
combating terrorism is reminiscent of anti-Chinese and anti-
communist sentiment of previous eras).  The Alien and Sedition 
Acts were designed to eliminate political subversives from the 
United States, and can be viewed as a Federalist effort to reduce 
immigrant support for the Republican Party.  See generally JAMES 
MORTON SMITH, FREEDOMS FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN 
CIVIL LIBERTIES (1956).  The Palmer Raids were raids, following a 
series of bombings, conducted under the direction of U.S. 
Attorney General Mitchell Palmer resulting in the deportation of 
alleged subversives.  See Johnson, Antiterrorism, supra, at 846-
50. 
12 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) 
(upholding internment of persons of Japanese ancestry during 
World War II); see also A.G. Block, History for Our Times: Pearl 
Harbor and the Birth of Modern California, CAL. J., Nov. 2001, at 
8 (analyzing similarities between the governments response to 
the attack on Pearl Harbor and violence of September 11, 2001).  
See generally Symposium, The Long Shadow of Korematsu, 40 B.C. L. 
REV. 1, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1 (1998) (analyzing implications 
of Korematsu decision). 
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Arabs and Muslims.13 
 
In sum, a complex matrix of otherness based on race, 
national origin, religion, and political ideology contributes to 
the current attacks on the civil rights of Arabs and Muslims in 
the United States.14  As has occurred in the past, the ripple 
effects of national security measures in the end may adversely 
affect the legal rights of all noncitizens, not just Arabs and 
Muslims.15  Indeed, as we contend in this article, the civil 
rights deprivations resulting from the war on terrorism may have 
                     
13 See Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese 
American Redress and the Racing of Arab Americans as 
Terrorists, 8 ASIAN L.J. 1, 11-26 (2001).  See generally MICHAEL 
OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1994) 
(analyzing construction of races in modern United States). 
14 See Adrien Katherine Wing, Reno v. American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee: A Critical Race Critique, 21 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 561, 571-94 (2000) (analyzing multiple dimensions of 
identity of Arabs that U.S. government allegedly sought to deport 
because of their political activities); see also Susan M. Akram, 
Scheherezade Meets Kafka: Two Dozen Sordid Tales of Ideological 
Exclusion, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 51 (1999) (reviewing evidence of 
discriminatory targeting of Arabs and Muslims by the U.S. 
government for detention, removal, and secret evidence 
proceedings, in immigration enforcement). 
15 See infra text accompanying notes ___. 
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long term adverse impacts on the civil rights of citizens as well 
as noncitizens in the United States. 
 
To help us better understand the latest war on terrorism, 
Part I of this Article analyzes the general demonization of Arabs 
and Muslims generally in the United States and how the law has 
been influenced by, and reinforced, the negative stereotypes.  
This section reviews the federal governments actions directed at 
Arabs and Muslims in the name of combating terrorism well before 
September 11.16  As Professor Edward Said has observed, terrorism 
in these times has displaced Communism as public enemy number 
one.17  That has translated into a near exclusive focus on 
foreign terrorists, particularly Arabs and Muslims.  Part II 
studies the federal governments zealous investigatory methods 
after September 11 directed at Muslim and Arab noncitizens, with 
disregard for their civil rights, and the possible long term 
impacts of that response. 
 
1. The Demonization of Persons of Arab and Muslim Ancestry 
 
Commentators long have observed how popular perceptions of 
racial and other minorities influence their treatment under the 
law.18  This proves to be true with respect to Arabs and Muslims. 
                     
16 For a summary of the adverse impacts of 1996 anti-
terrorism legislation on Arabs and Muslims, see Akram, supra note 
__; Michael J. Whidden, Note, Unequal Justice: Arabs in America 
and United States Antiterrorism Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2825 (2001); infra text accompanying notes ____. 
17 Edward Said, The Essential Terrorist, in BLAMING THE 
VICTIMS: SPURIOUS SCHOLARSHIP AND THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION 149 (Edward Said 
& Christopher Hitchens ed., 1988); see LAWRENCE HOWARD, TERRORISM: 
ROOTS, IMPACT, RESPONSE 1 (Lawrence Howard ed., 1992) (The 
phenomenon of terrorism has become a major concern of the 
American public.  The Reagan administration elevated it to the 
foremost foreign policy problem of the nation.). 
18 See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of 
the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression 
Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1992); 
Margaret M. Russell, Race and the Dominant Gaze: Narratives of 
Law and Inequality in Popular Film, 15 LEG. STUDS. FORUM 243 
(1991); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a 
Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367 
(1996); see also Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping 
Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 
733 (1995) (articulating need to recognize impacts of negative 
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 In sum,  
 
                                                                  
stereotypes and prejudice on legal decisionmaking).  See 
generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal 
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 
317 (1987) (articulating theory of unconscious racism and its 
impact on discrimination in modern United States). 
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Arab Americans and Muslims have been raced as 
terrorists: foreign, disloyal, and imminently threatening. 
 Although Arabs trace their roots to the Middle East and 
claim many different religious backgrounds, and Muslims come 
from all over the world and adhere to Islam, these 
distinctions are blurred and negative images about Arabs or 
Muslims are often attributed to both.  As Ibrahim Hooper of 
the Council on American-Islamic Relations notes, The common 
stereotypes are that were all Arabs, were all violent and 
were all conducting a holy war.19  
 
The demonizing of Arabs and Muslims in the United States, 
accompanied by harsh legal measures directed at them, began well 
before the tragedy of September 11, 2001.20  It can be traced to 
years of mythmaking by film and media,21 popular stereotypes,22 
and a campaign to build political support for U.S. foreign policy 
in the Middle East.23  Since at least the 1970s, U.S. laws and 
                     
19 Saito, supra note __, at 12 (footnote omitted). 
20 See Akram, supra note __ (tracing targeting of Arabs 
and Muslims in immigration enforcement). 
21  See infra text accompanying notes ____. 
22 See Edward Said, A Devil Theory of Islam, THE NATION, 
Aug. 12, 1996; see also AHMED YOUSEF & CAROLINE KEEBLE, THE AGENT: THE 
TRUTH BEHIND THE ANTI-MUSLIM CAMPAIGN IN AMERICA (1999) (tracing impact 
of anti-Arab, anti-Muslim campaign in United States). 
23 See infra text accompanying notes ___. 
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policies have been founded on the assumption that Arab and Muslim 
noncitizens have terrorist links and targeted them for special 
treatment under the law.24  The post-September 11 targeting of 
Muslims and Arabs is simply the latest chapter in this history.25 
 
2. The Stereotype of Arabs as Terrorists and Religious 
Fanatics 
 
                     
24 See infra text accompanying notes ___.  
25 See infra text accompanying notes ___. 
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Similar to the animus toward other racial minorities, anti-
Arab, anti-Muslim animus can be viewed as part of a dynamic 
process of racialization.26  Arabs and Muslims have been 
racialized by mainstream U.S. society in different ways from 
other minority groups:27 
                     
26 Omi and Winant describe race as an unstable and de-
centered complex of social meanings constantly being transformed 
by political struggle.  OMI & WINANT, supra note ___, at 68; see 
Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some 
Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994). 
27 As a historical matter, different racial groups have 
been racialized in different ways.  See generally JUAN F. PEREA ET 
AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA (2000) 
(collecting cases and historical literature on racialization of 
African Americans, Asian Americans, Latina/os, and Native 




The first, and most obvious, is the political violence of 
Jewish extremist groups, which is correctly viewed as 
emanating from the Arab-Israeli conflict.... The second is a 
more nativistic violence which is xenophobic and local in 
nature.... The third is a form of jingoist hostility and 
violence usually associated with international crises 
involving U.S. citizens....28 
 
The law and its enforcement of the law also has contributed to 
hostility toward Arabs and Muslims in the United States.29 
 
1. Politically-Motivated Violence and Intimidation 
 
                                                                  
LAW: A MULTIRACIAL APPROACH (2001) (collecting legal scholarship 
analyzing different civil rights issues facing various minority 
communities). 
28  Nabeel Abraham, Anti-Arab Racism and Violence in the  
United States, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARAB-AMERICAN IDENTITY 180 (Ernest 
McCarus ed., 1994) [hereinafter Abraham, Anti-Arab Racism] ; see 
also Nabeel Abraham, The Real Target of the Airport Atrocities, 
MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, Jan. 24, 1986, at 14-16; Nabeel Abraham, 
Arab-American Marginality: Mythos and Praxis, in ARAB-AMERICANS: 
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE __ (Baha Abu-Laban & Michael Suleiman eds., 
1989); Nabeel Abraham, The Gulf Crisis and Anti-Arab Racism in 
America, in COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE NEW WORLD ORDER AT HOME AND ABROAD __ 
(Cynthia Peters ed., 1991).   
29 See infra text accompanying notes ___. 
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The Arab-Israeli conflict contributes to the modern 
stereotype of Arabs and Muslims as terrorists.  Jewish 
extremist groups constitute an undeniable source of anti-Arab 
hate violence not discussed in conventional accounts of racist 
violence in the United States.30  According to the Rand 
Corporation, the Jewish Defense League (JDL), was one of the 
most active terrorist groups in the United States  in the 
1980s.31  Jewish extremist organizations committed approximately 
20 terrorist incidents and numerous other acts of violence, 
including extortion or threats, about one-fourth of the total 
terrorist acts in the United States in the 1980s.32 
 
Hate crime studies, however, generally fail to separately 
identify Arab ethnic origin in their victim classifications.33  
                     
30 Abraham, Anti-Arab Racism, supra note __, at 157 
31 BRUCE HOFFMAN, TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
POTENTIAL THREAT TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES 11, 15 (Rand Corp, 1986). 
32 John Harris, Domestic Terrorism in the 1980's, FBI LAW 
ENFORCEMENT BULL., Oct. 1987, at 6; see also Whidden, supra note __ 
(reviewing data before September 11, 2001, showing that most 
recent terrorist acts in the United States were not committed by 
Muslim or Arab groups). 
33 See, e.g., FBI, Terrorism in the United States, yearly  
reports, at http://www.fbi.gov/publications. 
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Others omit Jewish extremist groups from the categories of hate 
crime perpetrators.34  
 
                     
34 See, e.g., CHRIS LUTZ, THEY DONT ALL WEAR SHEETS: A 
CHRONOLOGY OF RACIST AND FAR RIGHT VIOLENCE1980-1986 (Center for 
Democratic Renewal/National Council of Churches, 1987); ANTI-
DEFAMATION LEAGUE, HATE GROUPS IN AMERICA (1988); ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, 
EXTREMISM ON THE RIGHT: A HANDBOOK (1988). 
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The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) of Bnai Brith engages in 
efforts to intimidate Arabs, Muslims, and others with similar 
views on the Middle East conflict, from engaging in political 
debate.  The ADL aggressively seeks to discredit or silence 
critics of Israel or defenders of Palestinian human rights.35  In 
1983, for example, the ADL released a handbook entitled Pro-Arab 
Propaganda in America: Vehicles and Voices,36 which characterizes 
groups or individuals who criticize Israel or Zionism as 
extremists intent on eradicating Israel or inciting anti-
Semitism in America.37  Besides listing of the most prominent 
scholars on Middle East issues, from Columbias Edward Said to 
Harvards Walid Khalidi, the handbook labeled every humanitarian 
organization dealing with the Middle East or Palestine as 
extremist. 
 
The ADL also has sought to silence pro-Muslim and pro-Arab 
messages.  For example, most recently, the Florida ADL 
unsuccessfully lobbied the Florida Commission on Human Relations 
to exclude a Muslim representative from a panel at a civil rights 
conference.38  The American Jewish Committee also sought to 
                     
35 See Alfred Lilienthal, The Changing Role of Bnai 
Briths Anti-Defamation League, WASH. REPORT ON MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS, 
June 1993, 18.  
36 See Pro-Arab Propaganda in America: Vehicles and 
Voices, A Handbook (Anti-Defamation League of Bnai Brith, 1983 
ed.), copy on file with the author.  
37 See Lilienthal, supra note __, at 18. 
38 See ADL and AJC Demand Muslim Panelists Be Excluded,  
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exclude Ghazi Khankan, executive director of the New York chapter 
of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), from 
participating in a public forum on multicultural understanding 
because he was anti-Israel.39  Along similar lines, the ADL 
demanded that CAIRs Northern California director be prevented 
from testifying about hate crimes before the California Select 
Committee on Hate Crimes.40 
 
                                                                  
WASH. REPORT ON MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 2002, at 83. 
39 See id. at 83. 
40 See id.  
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Nor have the efforts at silencing opposing political views 
stopped at these measures.  In January 1993, the results of a 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigation against 
veteran San Francisco Police Department officer Tom Gerard and an 
ADL-paid undercover agent Roy Bullock, came to light.  Law 
enforcement authorities uncovered computerized files on thousands 
of Arab Americans and Arab organizations, as well as many other 
organizations.41  The ADLs offices contained identical files, 
which reflected surveillance of the United Auto Workers, NAACP, 
Greenpeace, ACLU, Asian Law Caucus, National Lawyers Guild, 
Rainbow Coalition, Jews for Jesus, and three current or past 
members of the U.S. Congress (Nancy Pelosi, Ron Dellums, and Pete 
McCloskey).42  The information included confidential files from 
the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency.  The ADL, Gerard, 
and Bullock passed the surveillance information on to Israeli and 
South African intelligence agencies.43  As part of the settlement 
of lawsuits resulting from the investigation, the ADL has been 
permanently enjoined from engaging in any further illegal spying 
against Arab American and other civil rights groups.44  
 
The overall effect of the ADLs practices is to reinforce 
the image of Arabs as terrorists and security threats, thereby 
creating a climate of fear, suspicion, and hostility towards 
Arab-Americans and others who espouse critical views of Israel, 
possibly leading to death threats and bodily harm.45 
                     
41 See Dennis Opatray & Scott Winokur, S.F. Spying Case 
Details Laid Bare, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr. 11, 1993, at __. 
42 See Abdeen Jabara, The Anti-Defamation League: Civil 
Rights and Wrongs, 45 COVERTACTION, Summer 1993, at 28-29. 
43 See Dennis Opatray & Scott Winokur, Israeli Detainee 
Linked to S.F. Police Spy Case, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 12, 1993, at 
__; Jim McGee, Jewish Groups Tactics Investigated, WASHINGTON 
POST, Dec. 19, 1993, at __.  
44 See Final Settlement, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Comm v. Anti-Defamation League, Civ. Action No. 93-6358 RAP (Shx) 
(C.D. Cal.).  The class action was brought by the American-Arab 
Anti-Discrimination Committee, numerous civil rights 
organizations, and several individuals.  See Michael Gillespie, 
Los Angeles Court Hands Down Final Judgment in Anti-Defamation 
League Illegal Surveillance Case, WASH. REPORT ON MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS, 
Dec. 1999, www.washington-report.org; Martin Berg, ADL Agrees to 
Stop Spying on Civil Rights Groups, L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 28, 1999. 




2. The Impact of Anti-Arab Images in Popular Culture 
 
Building on existing stereotypes in U.S. society about Arabs 
and Muslims, media and film have found a ready audience for 
dangerous and one-dimensional images.  Such depictions contribute 
to the racialization of Arabs and Muslims and promotes and 
reinforces unconscious racism toward them.46 
 
Jack Shaheens review of Hollywood films offers convincing 
evidence of the vilification of Arabs and Muslims by the movie 
industry.47  Hollywood has made hundreds of movies in which Arabs 
or Muslims are portrayed as terrorists or otherwise placed in a 
negative, often non-human, light.  These movies show Westerners 
hurling such epithets at Arabs as assholes, bastards, camel-
dicks, pigs, devil-worshipers, jackals, rats, rag-
heads, towel-heads, scum-buckets, sons-of-dogs, buzzards 
of the jungle, sons-of-whores, sons-of-unnamed goats, and 
sons-of-she-camels.48  Arab women are portrayed primarily as 
weak and mute, covered in black, or as scantily clad belly 
dancers.49   
 
The U.S. Department of Defense has cooperated with Hollywood 
in making more than a dozen films showing U.S. soldiers killing 
                     
46 See supra text accompanying notes ___. 
47 See JACK G. SHAHEEN, REEL BAD ARABS: HOW HOLLYWOOD VILIFIES 
A PEOPLE (2001); see also Saito, supra note __, at 12-14 
(summarizing how racial stereotypes of Arabs and Muslims in film 
and popular culture affect law enforcement and private conduct). 
48 SHAHEEN, supra note __, at 11.  
49 See id. at __. 
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Arabs or Muslims.50  Audiences fully embrace the demonization in 
these movies: 
 
                     
50 See id. at 15. 
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To my knowledge, no Hollywood WWI, WWII, or Korean War 
movie has ever shown Americas fighting forces 
slaughtering children.  Yet, near the conclusion of 
[the movie] Rules of Engagement, U.S. marines open fire 
on the Yemenis, shooting 83 men, women, and children.  
During the scene, viewers rose to their feet, clapped 
and cheered.  Boasts director Friedkin, Ive seen 
audiences stand up and applaud the film throughout the 
United States.51  
 
Nor has Islam, which is inextricably linked with holy war, 
male patriarchy, and terrorism, fared any better on the silver 
screen.52  Muslims are shown as hostile invaders, or lecherous 
oil sheikhs intent on using nuclear weapons.53  A far-too-common 
scene shows a mosque with Arabs at prayer, cutting away to 
showing civilians being gunned down.54  
                     
51 Id. 
52 See Leti Volpp, Gazing Back, 14 BERKELEY WOMENS L.J. 149 
(1999) (book review) (examining interaction of race, gender, and 
culture in stereotypes about Muslim and other noncitizens and 
impact on the law). 
53 See SHAHEEN, supra note __, at 9. 




Film portrayals omit Arabs and Muslims as ordinary people, 
families with social interactions, or outstanding members of 
communities, including scholars, writers, or scientists.55  In 
modern U.S. film history, few movies have shown Arabs in a 
favorable light, and only a handful in which Arabs and Muslims 
had leading roles as protagonists.56  Few commentators have 
criticized the one-sided depiction of Arabs and Muslims.57 
 
                     
55 Such stereotypical depictions have been a problem for 
other minority groups as well.  See Delgado & Stefancic, supra 
note __; see also Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making of 
Invisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 965, 970-72 (1995) (noting 
invisibility of Latina/os in literature and other prominent 
places in U.S. culture). 
56 See SHAHEEN, supra note __, at 34-35. 
57 See id. at 31-33. 
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Stereotypes seen in film affect the conduct of public 
officials and private citizens.  Private citizens and public 
officials long have directed hate messages and violence, and 
discriminated against, Arabs and Muslims.58  For example, mayoral 
candidate Michael Guido distributed a campaign brochure in 
Dearborn, a Detroit suburb, in which he claimed the citys Arab 
Americans threaten our neighborhoods, the value of our property 
and a darned good way of life.59  In 1981, Michigan governor 
William Milliken, said in a newspaper interview that Michigans 
economic woes were due to the `damn Arabs.60  Such statements 
by public officials fuel the perception that attacks on this 
                     
58 See Abraham, Anti-Arab Racism, supra note __ at 188-92. 
 For detailed reports, see AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM., 
1991 REPORT ON ANTI-ARAB HATE CRIMES: POLITICAL AND HATE VIOLENCE AGAINST 
ARAB-AMERICANS; AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM., 1995 REPORT ON 
ANTI-ARAB RACISM: HATE CRIMES, DISCRIMINATION AND DEFAMATION OF ARAB-
AMERICANS;  AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM., 1996-97 REPORT ON HATE 
CRIMES & DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ARAB-AMERICANS; AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION COMM., 1998-2000 REPORT ON HATE CRIMES AND DISCRIMINATION 
AGAINST ARAB-AMERICANS (reports archived at http:///www.adc.org). 
59 Lets Talk About City Parks and the Arab Problem, 
brochure of the Guido Mayoral campaign (cited in Abraham, Anti-
Arab Racism, supra note __, at 191). 
60 Abraham, Anti-Arab Racism, supra note __, at 196 
(quoting Milliken).  
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community are acceptable.61 
 
                     
61 See id. at 195; see also supra note __ (citing reports 
connecting official policies with anti-Arab violence). 
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Because popular perceptions about Arabs and Muslims make 
acceptance of their campaign contributions politically risky, 
politicians have felt compelled to return financial contributions 
from Arab Americans.  In the 1984 presidential campaign, Walter 
Mondale returned $5,000 in contributions made by U.S. citizens of 
Arab ancestry.62  Philadelphia mayoral candidate Wilson Goode 
returned over $2,000 in campaign contributions from Arab 
Americans.63  In his first congressional race, Joe Kennedy 
returned $100 to James Abourezk, a former Democratic senator from 
North Dakota who is Arab American.64  Current New York Senator 
Hillary Clinton returned $50,000 to Muslim organizations.65  
Indeed, New York City Mayor Rudolph Guiliani returned ten million 
dollars given by a Saudi Arabian for the victims of the World 
Trade Center.66 
 
3. Racism in Times of National Crises 
 
Times of crisis often are accompanied by hostility toward 
minorities in the United States.  Perpetrators of hate crimes may 
not accurately differentiate among victims based on religion or 
ethnic origin, from Pakistanis, Indians, Iranians, and Japanese 
to Muslims, Sikhs and Christian Arabs.67 
                     
62 See Mondale Camp Returns Funds to U.S. Arabs, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 25, 1984, at sec. 1, p. 28. 
63 See Stephen Franklin, Arab-Americans Fall Victim to 
Mid-East Kuwaiti Ship Flagging Sparks Fears, CHI. TRIB., July 12, 
1987, at 19. 
64 See The Untouchables; Immigration Service Arrests 
Palestinians, THE NATION, Mar. 21, 1987. 
65 See Dean E. Murphy, Mrs. Clinton Says She Will Return 
Money Raised by a Muslim Group, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2000, at A1. 
 This phenomenon resembles the controversy during the Clinton 
administration about receipt of campaign contributions from 
foreign sources, which resulted in the investigation of many 
Asian American contributors.  See FRANK H. WU, YELLOW:  RACE IN 
AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE 104-16 (2001). 
66 See Neil MacFarquhar, Saudi Sheik Regrets Giuliani 
Turning Down His Donation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2001, at B4. 
67 See supra text accompanying note __ (discussing murder 
of Sikh as act of vengeance against Arabs and Muslims for 




[W]hile they are closely associated with Islam, only twelve 
percent of the United States four to five million Muslims 
are Arab and those Arab Muslims comprise a minority of the 
Arab American community.  American society, however, 
identifies Arabs and Islam as one and the same.  Coupled 
with this presumption is the prevailing misrepresentation of 
Islam as bent on a holy war against the United States.  
While extremists may invoke the Koran to justify terrorism, 
the vast majority of Islamic worshipers are decent, law-
abiding, productive citizens.68  
                     
68 Whidden, supra note __, at 2850 (footnotes omitted). 
 
 27 
Terrorist acts by small groups of Arabs and Muslims 
frequently are followed by generalized hostility toward Arab and 
Muslim communities.  In 1985, Lebanese Shia gunmen highjacked a 
TWA Flight 847 to Beirut, horribly beat to death a young American 
on the plane, and held the remaining passengers for over two 
weeks.69  Violent attacks against persons of Arab and Muslim 
origin around the United States followed.70  Islamic centers and 
Arab American organizations were vandalized and threatened.  A 
Houston mosque was firebombed.  A bomb placed in the American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee office in Boston exploded, 
severely injuring two policemen.71  Later, after terrorists 
                     
69 See Stalemate Continues; Hijackers Let Television 
Reporters Interview Jet Pilot, THE RECORD, June 19, 1985, at 1. 
70 See Abraham, Anti-Arab Racism, supra note __, at 161-
62; see also Bob Baker, Anti-Arab Violence Represents 17% of 
Racial, Religious Attacks in 1985, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1986, at 
part 1, p. 29 (discussing hate crime reports). 
71 See Abraham, Anti-Arab Racism, supra note ___, at 162.  
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hijacked the Achille Lauro cruise liner and murdered Leon 
Klinghoffer, a wave of generalized anti-Arab violence in the 
United States ensued, including a bombing of the Los Angeles 
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee office that killed 
its director.72  
 
                     
72 The day before his murder, the director, Alex Odeh, had 
appeared on a television interview in which he condemned 
terrorist acts, but said he believed Yasser Arafat was not behind 
the event.  At the time of Odehs murder, Jewish Defense League 
head Irv Rubin stated to reporters: No Jew or American should 
shed one tear for the destruction of a P.L.O. front in Santa Ana 
or anywhere else in the world. Bomb Kills Leader of U.S. Arab 
Group, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1985, at sec. 1, p.5.  Rubin later was 
indicted for conspiring to bomb a Los Angeles mosque and the 
office of California Congressman Darrell Issa, a person of 
Lebanese ancestry.  See David Rosenzweig, 2 JDL Leaders Are 
Indicted by U.S. Grand Jury, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2002, at part 2, 
p. 3; see also Delinda C. Hanley, Freeze on Jewish Defense League 
Assets Called for After JDL Bomb Plot Foiled, WASH. REP. ON MIDDLE 
EAST AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 2002, at 16 (discussing Jewish Defense 
League violence against Arabs and Muslims). 
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In 1986, in apparent response to the Reagan Administrations 
war on terrorism directed at Libya,73 another episode of anti-
Arab hysteria broke out.  The same night of the United States 
raid on Libya, the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee 
national office in Washington received threats.  In addition, the 
Detroit American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee office, the 
Dearborn Arab community center, and the Dearborn Arab-American 
newspaper all received bomb threats.74  Beatings and other 
violent attacks on Arabs were reported across the United 
States.75  The home of a Palestinian immigrant family was broken 
into, a smoke bomb thrown inside, and the words Go Back to 
Libya scrawled on the walls.76 
 
The Gulf War intensified anti-Arab hostility in the United 
States.  Before the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the American-Arab 
Anti-Discrimination Committee had reported five anti-Arab hate 
crimes that year.  Immediately after the invasion, from August 2, 
1990 until February 2, 1991, it reported 86 incidents.77  When 
U.S. intervention commenced in January 1991, Arab and Muslim 
community organizations were bombed, vandalized, and subject to 
harassment, while Arab-owned businesses were vandalized or 
                     
73 See infra text accompanying notes __. 
74 Abraham, Anti-Arab Racism, supra note __, at 171, and 
sources cited. 
75 See supra note __ (citing reports). 
76 See Steve Lerner, Terror Against Arabs in America, NEW 
REPUBLIC, July 28, 1986, at 24.  
77 See supra note __ (citing reports). 
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destroyed.78   
 
4. The U.S. Government and the Role of Law 
 
                     
78 See Abraham, Anti-Arab Racism, supra note __, at 204. 
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Institutional racism also has resulted in the targeting of 
Arabs and Muslims.79  The Nixon Administrations Operation 
Boulder was the first concerted U.S. government effort to target 
Arabs in the United States for special investigation and 
discourage their political activism on Middle Eastern issues.80  
Ostensibly designed to confront the threat posed by terrorists 
who took hostages and murdered athletes at the 1972 Munich 
Olympics, the Presidents directives authorized the FBI to 
investigate people of Arabic-speaking origin to determine their 
                     
79 See generally Ian F. Haney-Lopez, Institutional Racism: 
 Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 
YALE L.J. 1717 (2000) (articulating theory of institutional 
racism).  Law and its enforcement also contributes to the 
racialization of Arabs and Muslims.  See supra text accompanying 
notes __ (discussing racialization process). 
80 See PUB. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT __ (1974).  For discussion 
of the impacts of Operation Boulder on Arab Americans, see The 
Civil Rights of Arab-Americans, Information Paper No. 10, 
Association of Arab-American University Graduates (M. Cherif 
Bassiouni ed., Jan., 1974).   
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potential relationship with terrorist activities related to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.81  The FBI investigated and interrogated 
noncitizens and citizens of Arab origin,82 and the FBI and 
Justice Department admittedly wiretapped prominent Detroit lawyer 
Abdeen Jabara, then-President of the Association of Arab-American 
University Graduates.83  
 
                     
81 See N.Y TIMES, Oct. 5, 1972; Israel Fighting Terror with 
Terror, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1972; Lawrence Mosher, Arabs Taste 
U.S. Terror, NAT. OBSERVER, Nov. 18, 1972; CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, July 9, 
1973; NEWSWEEK, June 18, 1973, at 32.  At that time, the only 
terrorist acts in the U.S. related to the Arab-Israeli conflict 
were committed by the JDL.  See Hagopian, Minority Rights in a 
Nation-State: The Nixon Administrations Campaign Against Arab-
Americans, J. PALESTINE STUDS., Autumn-Winter, 1975-76. 
82 See Hagopian, supra note ___, at 102. 






Later in the 1970s, President Carter took numerous steps 
against Iranians and Iran in response to the crisis in which U.S. 
citizens were held hostage in Teheran.84  In the 1980s, the 
Reagan Administration targeted Libya in the name of combating 
terrorism.  President Reagan in 1986 announced that the U.S. 
government had irrefutable evidence that Libyan leader Muammar 
Qaddafi was responsible for terrorist attacks at the Rome and 
Vienna airports.85  The U.S. navy later that year shot down two 
Libyan planes off the coast of Libya.  President Reagan announced 
that we have the evidence that Qaddafi was sending hit teams to 
assassinate Reagan.  No evidence has ever been presented that 
Qaddafi was behind the terrorist attacks in Rome and Vienna or 
that any Libyan hit squads had been sent to the United States.86 
                     
84 See infra text accompanying notes ___. 
85 See NOAM CHOMSKY, PIRATES & EMPERORS: INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN 
THE REAL WORLD 138-40 (1986). 
86  A faction of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) that had broken with Yasser Arafat, was 
ultimately found to be responsible for the attacks on the Rome 
and Vienna airports.  [T]here [was] not the slightest evidence 
to implicate Libya.  CHOMSKY, supra note __, at 5-36.  Moreover, 
FBI assistant director Oliver Revell later admitted that claims 
that Qaddafi had sent assassins to the United States was a 






Nevertheless, the United States bombed Libya.87  In addition, 
vandalism and violence against United States residents of Arab or 
Middle Eastern origin and their community centers, mosques, 
businesses, and homes followed the public announcements.88 
 
                     
87 See CHOMSKY, supra note __, at 149-50. 






In the 1990s, the U.S. governments war on terrorism 
focused on Iraq and its leader, Saddam Hussein.  Characterizing 
Hussein as the new Hitler of the Middle East, the Bush 
administration accused Iraqi forces of atrocities against 
Kuwaitis, many that later proved to be fabricated.89  The FBI 
also initiated a nationwide interrogation effort against Arab and 
Muslim community leaders, activists, and anti-war 
demonstrators.90  Additional policy measures put in place were 
nationwide fingerprinting of all residents and immigrants in the 
United States of Arab origin, and the institution of a Federal 
Aviation Administration system of airline profiling of persons 
from the Arab world.91  Private harassment and violence against 
                     
89 See Noam Chomsky, The Gulf War, in THE REAL STORY SERIES: 
WHAT UNCLE SAM REALLY WANTS 60-68 (1997). 
90 See Domestic Repression and the Persian Gulf War, MSN 
NEWS, vol. 7, issue 1, special ed., 1991. 
91 See Akram, supra note __, at 52-53; Sharon LaFraniere, 
FBI Starts Interviewing Arab-American Leaders, WASH. POST., Jan. 
9, 1991, at A14; Emily Sachar, FBI Grills NY Arab-Americans, 
NEWSDAY, Jan. 29, 1991, at 6; Lisa Belkin, For Many Arab-
Americans, FBI Scrutiny Renews Fears, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1991; 
see also AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM., 1999-2000 REPORT, 
supra note __ (reviewing race profiling of Arabs and Muslims on 






the Arab and Muslim communities followed.92 
 
As this discussion suggests, the federal governments action 
against Arab and Muslim groups generally has been followed by 
indiscriminate threats and violence against Arabs and Muslims in 
the United States.  This frightening pattern has continued after 
the events of September 11.93 
 
                     
92 See supra note __ (citing reports). 






Foreign policy has played a large role behind immigration 
measures directed at Arabs and Muslims in the United States.  The 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) sought to deport 
noncitizens of Palestinian ancestry,94 at the same time that the 
federal government attempted to shut down Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) representative offices in the United States95 
and at the United Nations.96  In the 1980s, President Reagan 
issued a secret National Security Decision Directive that 
authorized the creation of the Alien Border Control Committee 
designed to prevent terrorists from entering or remaining in 
the United States.  The Committee considered proposals to 
implement a registry and processing procedure to collect 
information on noncitizens in the United States.  Under one 
proposal, intelligence agencies would provide the INS with 
names, nationalities and other identifying data and evidence 
relating to alien undesirables and suspected terrorists believed 
to be in ... the U.S.97  The Alien Border Control Committee also 
considered an INS-created strategy called Alien Terrorists and 
Undesirables: A Contingency Plan,98 which called for use of 
ideological exclusion grounds in the immigration laws against 
                     
94 See supra text accompanying notes ___. 
95 In 1987, Congress enacted an Anti-Terrorism Act which 
mandated the closure of the Palestine Information Office (PIO) in 
Washington, the official institution representing the PLO in the 
United States and the PLO Observer Mission at the United Nations. 
 Constitutional challenges to the Anti-Terrorism Act failed.  See 
Palestine Information Office v. Schultz, 853 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 
1988); Mendelsohn v. Meese, 695 F. Supp. 1474 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
96 See United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 
695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
97 Legislation to Implement the Recommendations of the 
Commn. on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians: 
Hearings on H.R. 442 before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Govt 
Relations of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 67 
(1987) (emphasis added).  
98 See MEMORANDUM FROM INVESTIGATIONS DIV., IMMIGRATION & 
NATURALIZATION SERV., ALIEN BORDER CONTROL (ABC) GROUP IV  CONTINGENCY PLANS 
(Nov. 18, 1986) (with attachments including INS, Alien Terrorists 
and Undesirables: A Contingency Plan (1986)) [hereinafter INS 






noncitizens only from Arab countries and Iran.99    
 
2. Efforts to Stifle Political Dissent: The Case of the LA 
8 
 
                     
99 See infra text accompanying notes __ (discussing 
ideological exclusion grounds).  Nationals of Algeria, Libya, 
Tunisia, Iran, Jordan, Syria, Morocco, and Lebanon were targeted 






Critics long have pointed out that the United States has 
discriminated against Arabs and Muslims in applying the terrorist 
exclusion provisions of the Immigration & Nationality Act 
(INA).100  Arabs, particularly Palestinians, are the primary 
groups subject to many of the terrorism provisions,101 as well as 
other measures taken in the war on terrorism.  During the Gulf 
War crisis, for example, government officials fingerprinted and 
photographed all entrants of Arab origin  and only Arabs  
regardless of past activities or any evidence of terrorist 
                     
100 See, e.g., John A. Scanlan, American-Arab  Getting the 
Balance Wrong  Again!, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 347, 363-68 (2000) 
(analyzing how U.S. government employed ideological exclusions 
against Arabs and Muslims); David Cole, Guilt By Association: 
Its Alive and Well at the INS, THE NATION, Feb. 15, 1993 (stating 
that, at the time, the LA 8 were the only noncitizens that the 
INS had ever sought to remove under terrorism provisions of 
immigration laws). 
101 See Akram, supra note __; Cole, supra note __; Whidden, 








                     
102 See Sharon LaFraniere & George Lardner, U.S. Set to 
Photograph, Fingerprint all New Iraqi and Kuwaiti Visitors, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 11, 1991, at A23.  The Department of Justice ordered 
all immigrants with Iraqi or Kuwaiti passports to be 
fingerprinted and photographed.  The FBI also interviewed 200 
Arab-American business and community leaders under the guise of 
uncovering terrorist affiliations.  For plans to resurrect 
these procedures, see Fingerprinting of Nonimmigrants Designated 
by the Attorney General, 58 Fed. Reg. 68, 024 (1993) (Dec. 23, 
1993).  Such targeted measures, although discriminatory, are 
difficult to challenge legally.  See infra text accompanying 






INS decisions to exclude and deport individuals for their 
speech or affiliation were based on provisions in the INA 
allowing exclusion and deportation on ideological grounds.103  In 
1977, Congress enacted the McGovern Amendment that permitted the 
Attorney General to waive the exclusion of any noncitizen that 
was based on affiliation with an organization that the U.S. 
government designated as terrorist.104  However, by a variety of 
means, consular officers could continue to base exclusion 
decisions on ideology.105  In 1979, Congress created a single 
                     
103 See INA  212(a)(27)-(29), 8 U.S.C.  1182(a)(27)-(29) 
(1952), as amended 22 U.S.C.  2691; see, e.g., Kleindienst v. 
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Allende v. Schultz, 845 F.2d 1111 
(1st Cir. 1988); Harvard Law School Forum v. Schultz, 633 F. 
Supp. 525 (D. Mass. 1986); Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 
(D.C. Cir. 1986), affd by equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 1 
(1987).  The ideological exclusion provisions had been the 
subject of sustained academic criticism as being inconsistent 
with the First Amendment.  See, e.g., John A. Scanlan, Aliens in 
the Marketplace of Ideas: The Government, the Academy, and the 
McCarren-Walter Act, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1481 (1988); Steven R. 
Shapiro, Ideological Exclusions: Closing the Border to Political 
Dissidents, 100 HARV. L. REV. 930 (1987); Philip Monrad, Comment, 
Ideological Exclusion, Plenary Power, and the PLO, 77 CAL. R. REV. 
831 (1989).  According to INS data, over 8,000 noncitizens were 
denied entry into the United States because of their political 
beliefs or associations between 1952 and 1984.  See Dave 
Martella, Comment, Defending the Land of the Free and the Home of 
the Fearful: The Use of Classified Information to Deport 
Suspected Terrorists, 7 AM. U. J. INTL L. & POLY 951, 962-63 
(1992) (citing INS estimates). 
104 22 U.S.C.  2691 (1988). 
105 The McGovern Amendment did not eliminate ideological 
exclusion for two reasons.  First, the waiver only applied to 
exclusion under INA  212(a)(28), which permitted consular 
officers to exclude noncitizens under the INA  212(a)(27) 
ideological exclusion grounds.  Second, the waivers were 
discretionary and unlikely to be approved without the 
recommendation of the State Department.  See id.; Keisha A. Gary, 
Congressional Proposals to Revive Guilt by Association: An 
Ineffective Plan to Stop Terrorism, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 227, 237 
(1994).  A later version of the McGovern Amendment was codified 
as 22 U.S.C.  2691 (1988) by the Foreign Relations Authorization 






exception to the McGovern Amendment that permitted exclusion of 
officials or representatives of the PLO.106  
 
                                                                  
(1987).  This version, however, kept the PLO exception.  This 
temporary provision later was made permanent, see Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 101-246,  128(1), 104 
Stat. 15, 30 (1990), before removal of most of the ideological 
exclusion provisions by the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-649,  601(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5071 (1990). 
106 The exception stated that the waiver is inapplicable to 






The years of federal government efforts to remove the LA 8" 
 shows the extremes to which it will resort in order to remove 
political dissidents from the country.107  The case began before 
dawn on January 26, 1987, when FBI, INS and Los Angeles police 
officers descended on the Los Angeles home of Khader Hamide, a 
U.S. lawful permanent resident, and his Kenyan-born wife Julie 
Mungai.108  The couple were handcuffed, told they were being 
arrested for terrorism, and taken into custody while police 
blocked the street and an FBI helicopter hovered overhead.109  Six 
                     
107 See Johnson, Antiterrorism, supra note __, at 865-69.  
For consideration of this case from different vantage points, see 
William C. Banks, The L.A. Eight and Investigation of Terrorist 
Threats in the United States, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 479 
(2000); Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Nativism, Terrorism, 
and Human Rights -- The Global Wrongs of Reno v. American-Arab 
Anti-Discrimination Committee, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 521 
(2000); Hiroshi Motomura, Judicial Review in Immigration Cases 
After AADC: Lessons From Civil Procedure, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 385 
(2000); Gerald L. Neuman, Terrorism, Selective Deportation and 
the First Amendment after Reno v. AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313 
(2000); Wing, supra note __. 
108 The published decisions in the case include Reno v. 
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999); 
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 170 F.3d 1264 
(9th Cir. 1999); American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 
132 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 1997); American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Comm. v. Reno, 119 F.3d 1367 (9th Cir. 1997); American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995); 
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Thornburgh, 970 F.2d 
501 (9th Cir. 1991); American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. 
Nelson, 940 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1991); American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm. v. Meese 714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1989). 
109 For detailed descriptions of the arrests, detentions 
and proceedings against the LA 8, see Akram, supra note __, at 
73; William Overend & Ronald L. Soble, 7 Tied to PLO Terrorist 
Wing Seized by INS, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1987; see also JAMES 
DEMPSEY & DAVID COLE, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY __ (1999) (discussing LA 8 
case); Susan M. Akram, Historic Court Decision Protects First 
Amendment Rights of Dissident Aliens, 18 IMMIGRATION NEWSLETTER 








other individuals were arrested that morning as part of the 
sweep.    
 
                                                                  
Information provided by the ADL triggered the FBI 
investigation of the Los Angeles 8.  See supra text accompanying 






The INS sought to remove the LA 8 from the United States 
based on political ideology.  Both the director of the FBI and 
the regional counsel of the INS testified to Congress that the 
sole basis of the governments efforts to deport the LA 8 was 
their political affiliations.  In the words of FBI director 
William Webster, [a]ll of them were arrested because they are 
alleged to be members of a world-wide Communist organization 
which under the [INA] makes them eligible for deportation .... If 
these individuals had been United States citizens, there would 
not have been a basis for their arrest.110  The evidence 
underlying the governments charges amounted to a claim that the 
LA 8 read or distributed pro-Palestinian literature linked to the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).  The 
district court found that the ideological exclusion grounds 
violated the First Amendment.111 
 
                     
110 Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence on Nomination of William Webster to be Director of 
Central Intelligence, 100th Cong. 94-95 (1987) (testimony of FBI 
Director William Webster); see DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note ___, at 
35. 
111 See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese 






In 1990 while the LA 8 case was pending, Congress repealed 
the ideological exclusions from the immigration laws.112  The INS 
then instituted new proceedings against the LA 8 based on 
nonideological grounds, including the addition of new terrorism 
charges.  The INA permits removal of noncitizens who have engaged 
in terrorist activity, which is defined as committing in an 
individual capacity or as a member of an organization, an act of 
terrorist activity or an act which the actor knows or reasonably 
should know, affords material support to any individual, 
organization or government in conducting a terrorist activity at 
any time ....113  This broad language authorizes the INS to 
deport or exclude an individual who has donated money to an 
organization for its legal, social, or charitable activities if 
any arm of that organization also has engaged in terrorism.114  
The thrust of the INS case was based on the LA 8's affiliation 
with the PFLP, a PLO-splinter organization, which he district 
court found was engaged in a wide range of lawful activities, 
from providing education, health care, social services and day 
care, to cultural and political activities.  Because this 
provision had never previously been used to seek to deport anyone 
from the United States, the LA 8 challenged the selective 
                     
112 See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649  
601(a), 101 Stat. 4978, 5071 (1990), amending Immigration & 
Nationality Act (INA)  212(a), 8 U.S.C.  1182(a). 
113 See INA  212(a)(4)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C.  
1182(a)(4)(B)(iii)(1990). 
114 See infra text accompanying notes __ (discussing 
breadth of definition of terrorist activity in immigration 
laws).  The United States Code includes a number of definitions 
of terrorist activity for law enforcement, surveillance, and 
other purposes.  The INA broadly defines terrorist activity for 
purposes of the immigration laws.  See, e.g., INA  
212(a)(3)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C.  1182(a)(3)(B)(ii) (listing terrorist 
activities without intent or political motivation requirements). 
 The USA PATRIOT Act expands the definition of terrorist 
activity.  See infra text accompanying notes __.  For criticism 
of the definition of terrorist activity in the INA, see Neuman, 
supra note __; Susan Dente Ross, In the Shadow of Terror: The 
Illusive First Amendment Rights of Aliens, 6 COMM. L. & POLY 76 
(2001); Nadine Strossen, When and How: Criticisms of Federal 
Counter-Terrorism Laws, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 51 (1997); 






enforcement of the immigration laws in retaliation for their 
exercise of protected First Amendment rights.115  In the end, the 
Supreme Court held that noncitizens unlawfully in the United 
States have no general constitutional right to assert selective 
enforcement as a defense to deportation.116  The Court ruled that 
the 1996 amendments to the immigration laws limiting judicial 
review, barred judicial review of their claim.117   
 
The INS continues to seek to deport the LA 8.  The INS has 
opposed their applications for relief from removal of two of the 
LA 8 on the basis of secret evidence.118 
 
3. The Secret Evidence Cases 
                     
115 See supra note __ (citing authorities).  The FBI had 
conducted a three and a half year investigation against the LA 8 
before turning the case over to the INS for lack of evidence for 
a criminal prosecution.  See DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note __, at 37-
38. 
116  See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee, 525 U.S. 471 (1999); infra text accompanying notes __ 
(discussing implications of this Supreme Court decision for 
challenges of selective enforcement).  
117 See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee, 525 U.S. at 471.  In reaching that conclusion, the 
Court relied on INA  242(g), 8 U.S.C.  1252(g), which provides:  
 
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any 
other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to 
hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising 
from the decision or action by the Attorney General to 
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal 
orders against any alien under this chapter. 
118 Following the Courts decision, the case was remanded 
to the immigration court.  In 2001, the court dismissed the 
primary removal charges on the grounds that they were not meant 
to apply retroactively to acts  participating in demonstrations, 
distributing newspapers, and fund-raising for humanitarian 
projects for a group classified by the U.S. government as a 
terrorist organization  committed before Congress enacted the 
removal grounds.  See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND 






The INS continues to seek to deport the INS has selectively 
targeted Arabs and Muslims through the use of secret evidence -- 
evidence that it refuses to disclose to the noncitizen or his 
counsel -- to charge, detain, and deny bond in removal 
proceedings.  Until recent years, the use of secret evidence by 
law enforcement agencies and INS has been extremely rare.119  The 
federal government brought over thirty secret evidence cases 
between 1987 and September 11, 2001, with two dozen being 
litigated between 1996 and 2001.120   
                     
119 See Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956); Jay v. Boyd, 350 
U.S. 931 (1956); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 
U.S. 537 (1950); United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 
(1953). 






In Rafeedie v. INS,121 Fouad Rafeedie, a 20-year lawful 
permanent resident of Palestinian origin, was arrested on 
returning to the United States after a two week trip to a 
conference in Syria sponsored by the Palestine Youth 
Organization.  He was placed in summary exclusion proceedings  
the first time such proceedings had ever been used against a 
lawful permanent resident  based on ideological exclusion 
grounds.122  Seeking to exclude Rafeedie without a hearing and 
without revealing its evidence to him, the INS claimed that 
disclosing its evidence against Rafeedie would be prejudicial to 
the public interest, or endanger the welfare, safety, or security 
of the United States.123  The court of appeals rejected the INS 
positions and mandated application of the normal due process 
analysis in deciding whether the federal governments national 
security interests outweighed Rafeedies First Amendment 
rights.124  The court stated that the only way Rafeedie could 
prevail would be if he can rebut the undisclosed evidence 
against him . . . .  It is difficult to imagine how even someone 
innocent of all wrongdoing could meet such a burden.125 
                     
121 See Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1988), 
affd in part, revd in part, remanded, 880 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 
1989). 
122 See INA  212(a)(27-29), 8 U.S.C.  1182(a)(27-29); 
supra text accompanying notes ___ (discussing ideological 
exclusions). 
123 Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. at 734. 
124 See id. 






Following repeal of the ideological exclusions in 1990,126 
the INS used secret evidence to detain and deport Arabs and 
Muslims.  In response to the 1993 Oklahoma City bombings, 
Congress enacted anti-terrorism legislation that has facilitated 
the targeting of Muslim and Arab noncitizens.  In 1996, Congress 
passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA)127 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Individual 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),128 which brought about radical 
changes to the immigration laws,129 and effectively allowed for 
ideological exclusion and removal.130 
 
Bolstered by the 1996 reforms curtailing the rights of 
noncitzens, the INS initiated approximately two dozen deportation 
proceedings on the basis of secret evidence, claiming that it 
would compromise the security of the United States.131  Although 
                     
126 See supra text accompanying notes __. 
127 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) [hereinafter 
AEDPA]; see Whidden, supra note __, at 2841-83 (summarizing 
genesis of AEDPA and analyzing its impact on Arabs and Muslims). 
128 Pub. L. No. 104-208, Title III, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). 
129 See infra text accompanying notes __.  
130 See infra note __ (citing authorities on breadth of the 
terrorist activity provisions of the INA).  For discussion of 
the use of these provisions to target Arabs and Muslims, see 
Scanlan, supra note __; Ross, supra note __. 
131 See Akram, supra note __ 52 n.4 (listing noncitizens 
involved in post-1996 secret evidence cases and noting that all 
known cases involved Arabs or Muslims); see also Martin Schwartz, 
Niels Frenzen, & Mayra L. Calo, Recent Developments in the INSs 
Use of Secret Evidence Against Aliens, in 2001-02 IMMIGRATION & 
NATURALIZATION HANDBOOK 300 (2001) (discussing secret evidence 
cases).  Many important decisions in these cases were made by the 
immigration courts, which do not publish their decisions.  
Citations to the cases below are from immigration court decisions 
and related materials.  Court documents in the cases discussed 
below are on file with Kit Gage, National coordinator of the 
National Coalition to Protect Political Freedom, 3321 12th 






denying that it selectively uses secret evidence against Arabs 
and Muslims, the INS has been unable to point to a single secret 
evidence case not involving an Arab or Muslim noncitizen.132   
                     
132 See Testimony of INS General Counsel Paul Virtue on 
Oct. 8, 1998, The National Security Considerations Involved in 
Asylum Applications: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information, 






AEDPA established a special procedure for detaining and 
deporting alien terrorists that permitted the use of secret 
evidence with certain procedural safeguards.133  The INS, however, 
has not yet used the new procedures.134  The INS instead has 
relied on pre-existing regulations authorizing the use of secret 
evidence in the immigration courts.135  By so doing, the INS 
avoids conforming the procedural safeguards in AEDPA, such as 
producing an unclassified summary of the secret evidence to the 
alien, having a federal judge assess the constitutionality of the 
use of secret evidence, and charging the noncitizen under a 
substantive terrorism provision of law, which would require the 
                     
133 Title IV of AEDPA addresses suspected alien 
terrorists.  AEDPA  401 established new procedures for deciding 
the admissibility or removability of suspected terrorists.  It 
defines an alien terrorist as any alien who has engaged, is 
engaged, or at any time after admission engages in any terrorist 
activity, including an act that affords material support to 
[any person or group] . . . conducting a terrorist activity.  
AEDPA  401 (codified at 8 U.S.C.  1531(1), 1227(a)(4)(B), 
1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)).  AEDPA  302 authorizes the Secretary of 
State to designate a foreign terrorist organization.  A 
foreign terrorist organization is (a) a foreign organization; 
(b) engaging in terrorist activity (as defined under 8 U.S.C.  
1182(a)(3)(B)); (c) that threatens the security of the U.S. or 
its citizens.  AEDPA  302 (codified at 8 U.S.C.  1189(a)(1) 
(Supp. V 2000)).   
 
Section 401 created a special removal court for alien 
terrorists that gives the special court the power to examine, 
ex parte and in camera, any evidence for which the Attorney 
General determines that public disclosure would pose a risk to 
the national security of the United States or to the security of 
any individual because it would disclose classified information. 
 AEDPA  401 (codified at 8 U.S.C.  1534(e)(3)(A)); see also 
Michael Scaperlanda, Are We That Far Gone?: Due Process and 
Secret Deportation Proceedings, 7 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 23 (1996) 
(analyzing proposed secret evidence proceedings in AEDPA). 
134 At the time of the publication of this article, the 
special terrorist removal court has never been used.  See 78 
INTERPRETER RELEASES 363 (Feb. 12, 2001).  






government to sustain its burden of proof.136   
 
  The secret evidence cases pursued by the INS reflect the 
selective targeting of Arabs and Muslims.  The cases of the 
Iraqi 7 arose out of the U.S. governments resettlement of 
6,000 Iraqi Kurds after the Gulf War.  Brought as refugees for 
resettlement to the United States,137 the Iraqi men had been 
recruited by the U.S. government to overthrow Saddam Hussein, and 
were later airlifted out of Iraq with their families when the 
attempt failed.138  The Iraqi 7" were placed in exclusion 
proceedings for entering without valid visas, and then held in 
detention as security risks ... against the United States.139  
Claiming that the evidence supporting the security risk 
allegations was classified, the INS would not reveal it.140  The 
immigration court reviewed the secret evidence and ordered the 
                     
136 See Akram, supra note __, at 72 (reviewing AEDPAs 
procedural protections in terrorist court). 
137 For a summary of the Iraqi 7 cases by the counsel for 
the noncitizens, see Neils Frenzen, National Security and 
Procedural Fairness: Secret Evidence and the Immigration Laws, 76 
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1677 (Nov. 22, 1999). 
138 See id. 
139 See id. 








                     






James Woolsey, the former Director of the CIA who directed 
the U.S. governments efforts to organize the overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein, was one of the lawyers representing the Iraqis.  The 
government denied him access to the secret evidence, claiming 
that it did not trust him to keep the information confidential.142 
 The INS ultimately released 500 pages of the evidence.  Besides 
concluding that hundreds of pages had been erroneously 
classified, Woolsey found that the evidence was based on serious 
errors in Arabic-English translations, ethnic and religious 
stereotyping by the FBI, and reliance on unreliable information, 
including rumors and innuendo.  Woolsey pointed out that either 
INS counsel or intelligence agents made significant false 
statements to the immigration judge.143  Despite the weakness of 
the governments case, the case was only concluded when five of 
the Iraqis entered into a settlement agreement withdrawing their 
pending asylum claims in order to obtain release from 
                     
142 See id. 
143 See The National Security Considerations Involved in 
Asylum Applications: Hearings Before the Tech., Terrorism and 
Govt Information Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 






detention.144  They had been detained for two years.145 
 
                     
144 See Frenzen, supra note __. 






Mazen al-Najjar and Anwar Haddam experienced the longest 
detention in secret evidence proceedings; Al-Najjar was initially 
held for three and a half years,146 and Haddam for four years.147  
Al-Najjar, a stateless Palestinian, was the editor-in-chief of a 
research journal of the World and Islam Studies Enterprise 
(WISE), a think-tank based at the University of South Florida 
devoted to dialogue on issues related to the Middle East.148  The 
INS arrested Al-Najjar and placed him in removal proceedings in 
1997 as part of an FBI investigation against a former 
administrator of WISE who became head of the Islamic Jihad.  The 
arrest and detention was based on secret evidence.149  
 
Anwar Haddam was an elected member of the Algerian 
Parliament.150  A Professor of Physics at the University of 
Algiers, he ran for election on the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) 
platform.151  The FIS, a moderate Islamic party, swept the 1991 
elections by 80% of the popular vote.  The Algerian military 
staged a coup detat, arrested the president of the FIS, and 
rounded up thousands of FIS members.  Top FIS officials were 
killed or imprisoned; thousands of FIS supporters were 
                     
146 See FBI Terror Probes Focus on Muslim, WASH. POST, Oct. 
31, 1998, at A1. 
147 See In re Anwar Haddam, 2000 BIA LEXIS 20, at 1 (BIA 
Dec. 1, 2000); see also Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp.2d 402 (D. 
N.J. 1999) (ordering release of Palestinian detained for one-and-
a-half years based on secret evidence). 
148 See Al-Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 
2001); Al-Najjar v. Reno, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2000).  
For discussion of various developments in the Al-Najjar case, see 
77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1747 (Dec. 18, 2000); 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 
1712 (Dec. 11, 2000); 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1566 (Nov. 6, 2000); 
77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 9377 (July 17, 2000).  The U.S. government 
later re-arrested and detained Al-Najjar after September 11.  See 
infra text accompanying notes ___. 
149 See Al-Najjar v. Reno, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1333-35. 
150 See Akram, supra note __, at 79-81 (analyzing case); In 
re Anwar Haddam, 2000 BIA LEXIS 20 (BIA Dec. 1, 2000). 






imprisoned, tortured, and executed.152  A civil war followed with 
tens of thousands of deaths resulting.153  One of the few elected 
FIS officials who managed to escape Algeria, Haddam entered the 
United States legally on a valid nonimmigrant visa in 1992 and 
later filed an asylum claim.154  The INS took Haddam into custody 
and detained him based on secret evidence.155  
                     
152 See id. at 9. 
153 See id. 
154 See id.  






In both the Al-Najjar and Haddam cases, as the secret 
evidence has either been unclassified or disclosed, it is evident 
that the governments terrorist claims were based on unreliable 
evidence.156  Both were released after years of detention. 
 
                                                                  
claim, stating that he was barred from asylum as a persecutor of 
others and rested its position primarily on evidence it 
maintained was classified and would not produce in court.  See 
Immigration & Nationality Act  208(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C.  
208(b)(2)(A)(i). 
156 See In re Haddam, No. A22-751-813 (BIA Sept. 10, 1998), 






Nasser Ahmed also was held in custody and denied bond for 
three years based on secret evidence.157  An Egyptian native, 
Ahmed was a court-appointed translator for the legal defense team 
of Sheik Abdel Rahman for the conspiracy to bomb the World Trade 
Center in New York City in 1996.158  During the trial, FBI and INS 
agents tried to convince Ahmed that he should assist in the 
Rahman investigation and threatened him with deportation if he 
refused to cooperate.159  Ahmed would not assist the government.  
The INS arrested and detained him and opposed Ahmeds asylum 
claim based on the secret evidence.160  Losing his case in the 
immigration court based on secret evidence, Ahmed filed a habeas 
corpus petition.161  After the INS released some of its secret 
                     
157 See Matter of Nasser Ahmed, No. A90-674-238 
(Immigration Court June 24, 1999).  The BIA denied Ahmeds appeal 
seeking a bond redetermination.  See In re Nasser Ahmed, No. 90-
674-238 (BIA Sept. 1996); see also DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note __, 
at 128-31 (discussing case). 
158 See infra text accompanying notes __. 
159 See Matter of Nasser Ahmed, supra note __. 
160 See DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note __, at 129. 







evidence, Ahmed refuted it.  On remand, the immigration court 
dismissed the evidence underlying the governments remaining 
contentions on the grounds that it was based on a primary 
informant who had personal reasons for desiring Ahmeds 
deportation.162 
 
As the secret evidence cases have slowly worked their way 
through the judicial process, the governments claims in all the 
cases have evaporated.  None of the cases included sufficient 
evidence of terrorism-related charges necessary to justify the 
years of detention.163  Besides the individual loss of liberty, 
the cases have chilled Arab and Muslim political speech. 
 
                     
162 In re Nasser Ahmed, at 7 (N.Y. EOIR, Immigration Court, 
July 30, 1999) (decision following remand). 








This section generally illustrates how stereotypes about 
Arabs and Muslims have influenced immigration law and its 
enforcement, as well as the civil rights of Arab and Muslim 
noncitizens in the United States.  This discussion is by no means 
comprehensive.  Other examples of the laws responding to 
perceived fears of Arab and Muslim terrorism are plentiful.  For 
example, in the 1990s, the much-publicized case of asylum seeker 
Sheik Omar Rahman, later convicted for his involvement in the 
1993 World Trade Center bombing,164 almost by itself resulted in 
changes to the immigration laws narrowing the rights of all 
asylum applicants.  An episode on the popular television show 60 
Minutes165 focusing on his alleged abuse of the asylum system 
triggered a chain reaction culminating in 1996 asylum reforms, 
including a summary exclusion procedure by which a noncitizen 
could be excluded from the country without a hearing on an asylum 
or other claim to relief.166   
                     
164 See United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 
1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 982 (2000).  For reference to how 
racist stereotypes  terrorist Arabs out to destroy American 
democracy  posed challenges to the defense, see Binny Miller, 
Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case 
Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485, 561 (1994). 
165 See PHILIP G. SCHRAG, A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR: THE CONGRESSIONAL 
BATTLE TO SAVE POLITICAL ASYLUM IN AMERICA 42-44, 134, 137, 148, 162, 
164, 217 (2000); 60 Minutes: How Did He Get Here? (CBS Television 
broadcast, Mar. 14, 1993). 
166 See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS 






2. The Civil Rights Implications of the Modern War on Terrorism 
 
                                                                  






Part I analyzed how the demonization of Arabs and Muslims 
has impacted the evolution of the law and encouraged harsh 
governmental efforts to remove Arabs and Muslims from the United 
States.167  This section analyzes how the same stereotypes have 
affected the civil rights of all persons of Arab and Muslim 
ancestry in the United States since September 11, 2001.168  The 
aftermath of the various national security measures promise to 
have enduring impacts on the civil rights of all minority groups 
in the United States. 
 
1. The Immediate Impacts   
 
                     
167 See supra text accompanying notes ___. 






The federal government responded with ferocity to the events 
of September 11.  Hundreds of Arab and Muslim noncitizens were 
rounded up as material witnesses in the ongoing investigation 
of the terrorism or detained on relatively minor immigration 
violations.169  The dragnet provoked criticism as a poor law 
enforcement technique as well as a major intrusion on fundamental 
civil liberties.170  Congress swiftly passed the USA PATRIOT 
Act,171 which, among other things, allowed the government to 
detain suspected noncitizen terrorists for up to a week without 
charges, and bolstered federal law enforcement surveillance 
powers over citizens, as well as immigrants, associated with 
terrorism.  President Bushs controversial military order 
allowing alleged noncitizen terrorists, including those arrested 
in the United States, to be tried in military courts with the 
accused guaranteed few rights, provoked a firestorm of 
controversy.172  Proposed regulations issued in November 2001 in 
response to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Zadvydas v. 
Davis173 holding that indefinite detention of noncitizens ordered 
removed from the country was not authorized by law, include an 
exception permitting indefinite detention of noncitizens for 
terrorism and national security reasons.174  Attorney General 
                     
169 See infra text accompanying notes ___ (analyzing in 
detail federal law enforcement response to September 11 events, 
including a massive dragnet directed at Muslims). 
170 See Jim McGee, Ex-FBI Officials Criticize Tactics on 
Terrorism, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2001, at A1; Lawrence, supra note 
__. 
171 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001). 
172 See Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 
(Nov. 16, 2001).  
173 533 U.S. 678 (2001).  
174 See 66 Fed. Reg. 56967, 56979-80 (Nov. 14, 2001) 
(discussing 8 C.F.R.  241.14(d)).  The Court suggested that this 
might be constitutionally permissible.  See Zadvydas, 121 S. Ct. 
at 2502 (Neither do we consider terrorism or other special 
circumstances where special arguments might be made for forms of 
preventative detention and for heightened deference to the 






Ashcroft issued an interim rule allowing electronic surveillance 
of attorney-client communications with detained terrorists.175 
 
                                                                  
national security.).  For criticism of the proposed regulation, 
see Immigrant Rights Clinic, Administrative Comment: Indefinite 
Detention Without Probable Cause: A Comment on INS Interim Rule 8 
C.F.R.  287.3, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 397 (2000/01). 
175 See 66 Fed. Reg. 55062 (Oct. 31, 2001); Neil A. Lewis & 
Christopher Marquis, Larger Visa Waits for Arabs; Stir Over U.S. 
Eavesdropping, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2001, at A1; George Lardner 







To the extent that the U.S. responses to September 11 can be 
characterized as regulating immigration, the law affords 
considerable leeway to the political branches of the federal 
government.  The Supreme Court has upheld racial, national 
origin, political, and other forms of discrimination against 
noncitizens in the immigration laws that would patently violate 
the Constitution if the rights of citizens were implicated.176  
The so-called plenary power doctrine creates a constitutional 
immunity from judicial scrutiny of substantive immigration 
judgments of Congress and the Executive Branch.177  Immigration 
law, in which the powers of the U.S. government are at their 
zenith, thus allows the federal government to lash out at the 
particular undesirable groups of the day.178  Such authority 
increases exponentially when, as in the case of international 
terrorism, perceived foreign relations and national security 
                     
176 See, e.g., The Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping 
v. United States), 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (upholding racial 
discrimination in immigration laws); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 
342 U.S. 580 (1952) (allowing for deportation of immigrants based 
on their political views); see also Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 
(2001) (upholding gender discrimination in citizenship laws); 
Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 
(1999) (holding that courts lacked authority to review claim of 
selective enforcement of immigration laws by Muslim noncitizens); 
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (holding 
that Presidents policy of interdicting Haitians fleeing 
political violence on high seas and returning them to Haiti 
without hearing asylum and other claims did not violate domestic 
or international law). 
177 But see Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power 
Doctrine?  A Tentative Apology and Prediction for Our Strange But 
Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
257 (2000) (questioning whether plenary power doctrine in fact 
protects immigration laws form constitutional scrutiny). 
178 See Kevin R. Johnson, Race, The Immigration Laws, and 
Domestic Race Relations:  A Magic Mirror Into the Heart of 
Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111 (1998) (analyzing use of immigration 
laws to adversely affect racial minorities); Johnson, 
Antiterrorism, supra note __ (same for political minorities); 
Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration:  The 
Intersection of Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 






matters are at issue.179  As history teaches, with immigration law 
and its enforcement firmly in the hands of the federal 
government,180 uniform, national civil rights deprivations may 
result.181 
                     
179 See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 
(1999) (stating that we have recognized that judicial deference 
to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the 
immigration context where officials `exercise especially 
sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign 
relations) (citing INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988)); 
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 n.17 (1976) (`[A]ny policy 
toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with 
contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign 
relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican 
form of government.  Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to 
the political branches of government as to be largely immune from 
judicial inquiry or interference.) (quoting Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952) (footnote omitted)); see 
Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in 
Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 
1255 (1988).  Such deference combines with that ordinarily 
accorded agency action to create a most potent form of deference 
to the Executive Branchs immigration decisions.  See Aguirre-
Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 423-24 (relying on Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 
(1974)); INS v. Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (stating that 
agency fact-finding could be reversed only if the evidence 
presented . . . was such that a reasonable factfinder would have 
to conclude that the requisite fear of persecution existed. 
(citation omitted); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Responding to the 
"Litigation Explosion":  The Plain Meaning of Executive Branch 
Primacy Over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REV. 413 (1993) (analyzing 
the impact of deference to agency action in Supreme Courts 
immigration decisions). 
180 See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (Power 
to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal 
power.) (citations omitted); see also League of United Latin 
American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (1995) (holding 
that most of Proposition 187, California law seeking to regulate 
undocumented immigration, was pre-empted by federal law).  But 
see Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note __ (contending that 
states should have greater role in regulating immigration). 






1. The Dragnet 
 
                                                                  
THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1850-1990 (1993) (analyzing how 
exclusionary federal immigration laws adversely affected Asian 
Americans); IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW (1996) (analyzing law in 
place from 1790-1952 requiring that alien be white in order to 
naturalize).  Alternatively, the federal government can act 
nationally to protect civil rights of noncitizens against conduct 







The events of September 11, 2001 understandably provoked an 
immediate and ferocious federal governmental response.  
Heightened security measures were the first order of the day.  
Within a matter of weeks, the U.S. government arrested and 
detained over 1,200 Arab and Muslim immigrants.182  The mass 
dragnet of Arab and Muslim men from many nations, with the 
largest numbers from Pakistan and Egypt, apparently has failed to 
produce any direct links to the terrorists acts; about one 
hundred were charged with minor crimes and another 500 were held 
in custody on immigration-related matters, such as having 
overstayed their temporary nonimmigrant visas.183  Attorney 
                     
182 See David E. Rovella, Clock Ticks on 9/11 Detentions, 
NATL L.J., Nov. 5, 2001, at A1; A Deliberate Strategy of 
Disruption, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2001, at A01; Lois Romano & David 
S. Fallis, Questions Swirl Around Men Held in Terror Probe, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 15, 2001, at A01.  One Pakistani man died in federal 
custody under mysterious circumstances.  See Guy Gugliotta, 
Pakistani Held After Sept. 11 Attacks Dies in Cell, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 25, 2001, at A18. 
183 See DOJ Orders Incentives, `Voluntary Interviews of 
Aliens to Obtain Info on Terrorists, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1816, 
1817 (Dec. 3, 2001); Josh Meyer, The Investigation: The Dragnet 
Produces Few Terrorist Ties, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2001, at A1; see 
also Greg Smith & Joe Calderone, No Big Fish in 9/11 Dragnet, 
DAILY NEWS (New York), Nov. 30, 2001, at 6 (The dragnet that 
swept through New York in search of terrorists in the days after 
Sept. 11 scraped up mostly a handful of small-time hustlers and 
hapless immigrants with visa problems.).  The first indictment 
for conspiracy in the hijackings was of a noncitizen in federal 
custody for immigration violations on September 11.  See David 
Johnston & Philip Shenon, Man Held in Custody Since August is 
Charged With a Role in Sept. 11 Terror Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 
2001, at A1. 
 
Information remains sketchy about the persons detained 
because the Attorney General has refused to release specific 
information about them, prompting criticism by U.S. Senator 
Russell Feingold, see Russ Feingold, Name the Detainees, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 23, 2001, at B07, and a Freedom of Information Act 
lawsuit, see Rights Groups Sue DOJ, INS for Information on Those 
Detained or Arrested Following September 11, 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES 
5 (Jan. 2, 2002).  Information produced in response to the 
litigation shows that the handling of Muslims arrested on 






General John Ashcroft admitted that minor immigration charges 
would be used to hold noncitizens while the criminal 
investigation continues.184 
 
                                                                  
and sloppy bookkeeping and that dues process was shortchanged . . 
. .  Jim Edwards, Data Show Shoddy Due Process for Post-Sept. 11 
Immigration Detainees, N.J. L.J., Feb. 6, 2002. 
184 See Immigrant Rights Clinic, supra note __, at 414 






The nature and conditions of the initial wave of mass 
arrests and detentions warrant consideration.  Arab and Muslim 
detainees were held for weeks without any charges filed against 
them and without being provided basic information about why 
federal authorities continued to detain them.185  The U.S. 
government, for example, held Dr. Al-Badr Al-Hazmi, a radiologist 
who had lived as a lawful permanent resident for years with his 
family in San Antonio, for two weeks in large part because he 
shared the same last name  a common one in Saudi Arabia -- with 
two of the September 11 hijackers.186  The U.S. government 
arrested and held a Yemeni immigrant for two months who was 
interrogated and threatened, before being released without being 
charged.187 One Muslim student was arrested for visa problems and 
held in a local jail in Mississippi, where as police watched he 
was beaten by other prisoners for being a terrorist.188  An 
Egyptian computer engineering student was wrongly detained for 
over three weeks and charged with lying to federal investigators 
about ownership of an aviation radio allegedly recovered in his 
hotel room, which (as it turned out) in fact did not belong to 
him.189  Not surprisingly given the tenor of the times, there was 
virtually no real public outcry about the mass arrests.190   
                     
185 See Evan Thomas & Michael Isikoff, Justice Kept in the 
Dark, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 10, 2001, at 37.  In addition, after 
September 11, the immigration courts began holding secret 
hearings in immigration cases of noncitizens as part of the 
criminal investigation.  See William Glaberson, Closed 
Immigration Hearings Criticized as Prejudicial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
7, 2001, at B7. 
186 See Thomas & Isikoff, supra note ___, at 42. 
187 See Susan Milligan, Fighting Terror/The Detainees 
Testimony; Yemeni Immigrant Says He Was Abused, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 
5, 2001, at A13. 
188 See Thomas & Isikoff, supra note ___, at 39-40 
189 See June Fritsch, Grateful Egyptian is Freed as U.S. 
Terror Case Fizzles, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at A1.  The case 
began to unravel . . . , when the real owner of the radio, a 
private pilot and American citizen, came forward to claim it.  He 
had left it in his room . . . of the hotel.  Id.   
190 Indeed, in Attorney General Ashcrofts testimony before 






The dragnet did not end there.  The Justice Department also 
sought to interview about 5000 men -- almost all of them Arab or 
Muslim -- between the ages of 18-33 who had arrived on 
nonimmigrant visas in the United States since January 1, 2000.191 
                                                                  
Bush administrations anti-terrorism policies as aiding the 
terrorist cause.  See Excerpts from Attorney Generals Testimony 
Before Senate Judiciary Committee, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2002, at 
B6. 






There was no evidence that any of the 5000 had been involved in 
terrorist activities.  Although technically voluntary,192 the 
interviews with law enforcement authorities undoubtedly felt 
compulsory to many.  Arab and Muslim fears of detention and 
deportation193 were reinforced by the November 2001 arrest and 
                                                                  
Incentives, `Voluntary Interviews of Aliens to Obtain Info on 
Terrorists, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1816, 1817 (Dec. 3, 2001). 
192 See Administration Defends Military Commissions, Other 
Antiterrorism Measures During Senate Hearing, 78 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 1809, 1810 (Dec. 3, 2001) (summarizing congressional 
testimony of Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff that 
interviews were voluntary and based not on race profiles but on 
the fact that al Qaeda terrorist group recruits from specific 
nations and encourages use of certain visas). 






threatened deportation of Mazen Al-Najjar, who had previously 
been held on secret evidence and released after the government 
failed to provide any evidence that Al-Najjar was engaged in 
terrorist activity.194 
                                                                  
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 2, 2001, at 1; Tom Kenworthy, Arabs Fear that 
Cooperation Could be Costly, USA TODAY, Dec. 3, 2001, at 4A.  
194 See Al Najjar Again in INS Detention Due to Alleged 
Terrorist Ties, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1859 (Dec. 10, 2001); 
Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; It Can Happen Here, N.Y. TIMES, 






                                                                  
(discussing Al-Najjars detention based on secret evidence).  
Under the immigration laws, terrorist activity is defined 
broadly to include donations of funds to the humanitarian 
activities of a terrorist organization.  See Johnson, 
Antiterrorism, supra note __, at 866-67 (analyzing breadth of INA 
 213(a)(3)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C.  1182 (a)(3)(B)(iii)); supra text 
accompanying notes __ (discussing breadth of definition); see 
also Neuman, supra note __, at 322-37 (contrasting various 






The questioning of Muslims could be expected to alienate the 
noncitizens interviewed.  A memorandum from the Office of the 
U.S. Deputy Attorney General offered detailed instructions on 
information to be solicited, and mentioned that the U.S. 
government should be informed if an interviewee was suspected of 
being in the country in violation of the immigration laws.195  
This shows an effort to remove Arabs and Muslims from the country 
based on immigration law violations wholly unrelated to 
terrorism, as part of the war on terrorism.196 
                     
195 See Office of the Deputy Attorney General, Guidelines 
for the Interviews Regarding International Terrorism, Nov. 9, 
2001, reprinted in 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1829 (Dec. 3, 2001) 
(Appendix I). 
196 To this end, the federal government detained Arabs and 
Muslims held for immigration violations pending deportation as a 






                                                                  
tough on immigration enforcement.  See Testimony of Margaret H. 
Taylor, Professor of Wake Forest, University School of Law, 
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, 
Judiciary Committee, House of Representatives, FED. DOC. 






The questions suggested that the Arab and Muslim community 
was prone to disloyalty.  One line of questioning was as follows: 
You should ask the individual if he noticed anybody who reacted 
in a surprising or inappropriate way to the news of the September 
11th attacks.  You should ask him how he felt when he heard the 
news.197  This tracks questions reportedly asked by federal 
investigators soon after the bombing.  At that time, the FBI 
asked persons of Arab ancestry the following: 
 
How do you feel about what happened last week in New York? 
 
Does it make you sad? 
 
Does it make you happy? 
 
Does it make you angry? 
 
How do you feel about being American? 
 
How do you feel about being an Arab? 
 
Why is it that America is considered the enemy?198  
 
                     
197 See Office of the Deputy Attorney General, supra note 
___, at 4. 
198 Gina Keating, ACLU Faults FBI for Aggressive 






Despite the criticism, legal support may exist for the 
dragnet.  In Brown v. City of Oneonta,199 a crime victim 
identified a young African American man as the perpetrator of a 
burglary and assault who, while committing the crime, cut himself 
with a knife; the police attempted to question all African 
American students at the local university and over the next 
several days, the police conducted a `sweep of Oneonta, stopping 
and questioning non-white persons on the streets and inspecting 
their hands for cuts.  More than two hundred persons were 
questioned during that period, but no suspect was apprehended.  
The court of appeals held that, although the police employed an 
old-fashioned dragnet like those police techniques long condemned 
as overbroad and over-inclusive,200 the sweep did not violate the 
                     
199 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added), cert. 
denied, 122 S. Ct. 44 (2001). 
200 See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal 
Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 351 (1949); see, 
e.g., Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (reversing rape 






Equal Protection Clause.201  Oneonta offers legal justification 
                                                                  
fingerprinted, along with over twenty other African Americans, in 
violation of Fourth Amendment). 
201 See Oneonta, 221 F.3d at 337 (Plaintiffs do not allege 
that upon hearing that a violent crime had been committed, the 
police used an established profile of violent criminals to 






for the federal governments Arab and Muslim dragnet even though 
law enforcement in both instances arguably relied excessively on 
race in a criminal investigation.202  Besides the fact that the 
alleged perpetrators of the terrorist acts were Muslim, another 
consideration  the need to establish a discriminatory intent  
would make it difficult to prevail on an Equal Protection 
claim.203 
 
                                                                  
allege that the defendant law enforcement agencies have a regular 
policy based upon racial stereotypes that all black . . . 
residents be questioned whenever a violent crime is reported.). 
202 See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect 
Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine, 48 UCLA L. 
REV. 1075, 1090-92 (2001). 
203 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).  The 
academic challenges to the intent requirement are legion.  See, 






Muslims allegedly perpetrated the terrorism of September 11 
and a few Arab and Muslim noncitizens might have information 
about terrorist networks.  The dragnet directed at all Arabs and 
Muslims, however, is contrary to fundamental notions of equality 
and the individualized suspicion ordinarily required for a stop 
under the Fourth Amendment.204  It exemplifies the excessive 
reliance on race in the criminal investigation, a frequent law 
enforcement problem,205 and shows how, once race (at least of 
nonwhites) enters the process, it can come to predominate the 
investigatory process.  To target an entire minority group across 
the country for questioning is obviously over-inclusive.  Over 
one million persons of Arab ancestry in the United States,206 all 
who may feel threatened and under suspicion, cannot miss the not-
too-subtle message sent by the federal government. 
 
In important ways, the September 11 dragnet employed by the 
federal government resembles the Japanese internment during World 
War II.207  Statistical probabilities, not individualized 
suspicion, resulted in action directed at a discrete and insular 
minority who have been classified as an alien enemy.208  
National identity and loyalty are defined in part by foreign 
appearance, ambiguous as that may be.209  In some ways, the 
                     
204 See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 
(1989); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) 
205 See Banks, supra note __. 
206 See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Profile of Selected 
Social Characteristics: 2000 
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/TTable?ds_name=ACS_C2SS_EST_
G00_)(visited Dec. 10, 2001). 
207 See supra text accompanying notes __; see also KENNETH 
L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA 91 (1989) (One of the saddest lessons 
of Korematsu is that we do not seem to learn much from the 
lessons of the past.) 
208 See United States v. Carolene Prods, 304 U.S. 144, 152 
n.4 (1938) (holding that heightened level of scrutiny of 
classifications affecting discrete and insular minorities might 
be justified because of deficiencies of political process). 
209 See WU, supra note __, at 79-129; Keith Aoki Foreign-






current treatment of Arabs and Muslims is more extralegal than 
the internment.  There is no Executive Order at issue governing 
the treatment of Arabs and Muslims, or a formal declaration of 
war.210   
 
                                                                  
Propaganda, and Bifurcated Racial Stereotype, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. 
AM. L.J. 1 (1997); Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: 
Citizenship, Foreignness, and Racial Hierarchy in American 
Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 261 (1997).  Given the diversity of 
appearance in these communities, the very concept of Arab and 
Muslim appearance is a misnomer.  See SHAHEEN, supra note __, at 
4; MICHAEL SULEIMAN, ARABS IN AMERICA: BUILDING A NEW FUTURE __ (1989). 
210 See supra note __.  In response to previous claims of 
unlawful national origin or race discrimination, the Executive 
Branch has been quick to deny that a regulation permitted such 






The law also affords considerable support for the federal 
government to selectively enforce the immigration laws.  In a 
similar time of national crisis when U.S. citizens were held 
hostage in Iran, a court of appeals in Narenji v. Civilletti 
upheld a regulation that required only Iranian students on 
nonimmigrant visas to report to the INS and provide information 
about residence and evidence of school enrollment.211  The court 
held that the regulation had a rational basis and emphasized 
that it is not the business of courts to pass judgment on the 
decisions of the President in the field of foreign policy.212  
Courts reviewing other regulations directed at Iranian citizens 
                     
211 See Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (1979), cert. 
denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980); see also Hiroshi Motomura, 
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom 
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 
545, 587-88 (1990) (discussing how district court had sought to 
invalidate the Presidents action because it constituted 
discrimination on the basis of nationality); Sale v. Haitian 
Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (upholding interdiction 
and repatriation policy directed exclusively at Haitians). 






refused to disturb the Executive Branchs judgment.213  This 
precedent arguably supports the Justice Departments questioning 
of all Arab and Muslim noncitizens.214  There are important 
distinctions between this instance and that case, however.  The 
policy at issue in Narenji was based on nationality, while 
current targeting of Arabs and Muslims, who are from many 
different nations, is not.  Whether this distinction would 
provide the support for a successful legal challenge is unclear. 
  
 
                     
213 See, e.g., Ghaelian v. INS, 717 F.2d 950 (6th Cir. 
1983) (holding that court lacked jurisdiction to review Equal 
Protection challenge to regulation in deportation action); 
Dasltmalchi v. INS, 660 F.3d 880 (3d Cir. 1981) (same); Nademi v. 
INS, 679 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1982) (upholding regulation allowing 
Iranian citizens only 15 days before voluntarily departing the 
country); Malek-Marzban v. INS, 653 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1981) 
(same) 






Recent Supreme Court precedent further suggests that it will 
be difficult to prevail on any claim that the federal government 
is selectively enforcing the immigration laws.215  The Court in 
                     
215 See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee, 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that INA  242(g), 8 
U.S.C.  1252(g), barred review of selective enforcement claim by 
members of Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine); supra 
text accompanying notes __ (discussing case of LA-8).  For 
analysis of the selective enforcement claims on nationality and 
foreign policy grounds, see Neuman, supra note __, at 338-41; see 
also David A. Martin, On Counterintuitive Consequences and 
Choosing the Right Control Group: A Defense of Reno v. AADC, 14 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 363, 379-83 (2000) (suggesting that the Court in 
its analysis should have considered noncitizens stake in the 






Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee expressed 
disfavor of such claims: [t]he Executive should not have to 
disclose its `real reasons for deeming nationals of a particular 
country a special threat  or indeed for simply wishing to 
antagonize a particular foreign country by focusing on that 
countrys nationals  and even if it did disclose them a court 
would be ill equipped to determine their authenticity and utterly 
unable to assess their adequacy.216  The Court, however, offered 
a narrow window for selective enforcement claims, acknowledging 
the possibility of a rare case in which the alleged basis of 
discrimination is so outrageous that such a claim might lie.217   
                                                                  
resident or on a temporary student visa).  
216 American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 
at 491. 
217 Id.; cf. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 
(1984) (stating that exclusionary rule might apply to deportation 
proceedings in cases of egregious violations of Fourth Amendment 
or other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental 
fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence 
obtained) (citation omitted); Judy C. Wong, Note, Egregious 
Fourth Amendment Violations and the Use of the Exclusionary Rule 
in Deportation Hearings: The Need for Substantive Equal 
Protection Rights for Undocumented Immigrants, 28 COLUM. HUM RTS. 
L. REV. 431, 455-60 (1997) (summarizing lower court decisions 






                                                                  
egregious Fourth Amendment violation justifying application of 
exclusionary rule). 
The judicial deference to the federal governments actions 
directed at Iranians in the United States during the hostage 
crisis was criticized in ways that apply equally to the reaction 







Narenji is troublesome because an executive classification 
based on nationality in a foreign affairs crisis poses the 
danger that the Executive will overvalue the government 
interest and undervalue the individual constitutional 
interest.  In a severe crisis, the political and 
psychological pressures on the Executive are extreme.  In 
this situation, executive measures may be motivated by 
frustration or desperation rather than an assessment of 
their actual usefulness, or they may reflect little more 
than a desire to appear stern and decisive.  Conversely, in 
times of crisis the individual interests of persons selected 
for special burdens may be grossly undervalued.  Indeed, the 
virulence of popular feeling against Iranian nationals 
during the hostage crisis raises the possibility that the 
Executive, in imposing special burdens on Iranian students, 
may have been reflecting to some extent a constitutionally 
impermissible hostility based on national origin.  The 
atmosphere during the hostage crisis was marked by a 
hostility directed at citizens of Iran that resembled to 
some extent the hostility that is frequently directed toward 
citizens of an enemy nation during a war.218  
 
                     
218 See Peter E. Quint, The Separation of Powers Under 
Carter, 62 TEX. L. REV. 785, 856 (1984) (emphasis added) 
(footnotes omitted).  Cf. PETER ANDREAS, BORDER GAMES: POLICING THE 
U.S.-MEXICO DIVIDE (2000)(analyzing how U.S. government has pursued 
increased border enforcement for political and symbolic impacts 






In the aftermath of September 11, the U.S. government 
arguably overreacted.  Clearly, it placed little value on the 
liberty and equality interests of Arabs and Muslims.219  The 
response may be motivated in part by impermissible hostility 
based on national origin.  Arabs and Muslims long have suffered 
discrimination in the United States,220 and hate crimes against, 
and animosity toward, Arabs and Muslims increased greatly after 
September 11.221  With few legal constraints, the federal 
government adopted extreme action, with a largely symbolic 
impact.222  
 
Moreover, the dragnet might prove to be a poor law 
enforcement technique.  Race profiling in criminal law 
enforcement has been criticized because, by alienating minority 
communities, it increases the difficulties of securing their 
                     
219 See supra text accompanying notes ___. 
220 See, e.g., St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 
604 (1987); Amini v. Oberlin College, 259 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 
2001); see also supra text accompanying notes ___ (discussing 
hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims). 
221 See supra text accompanying notes ___. 
222 The claim that the federal government overreacted is 
buttressed by the fact that some state and local authorities 
refused to cooperate with some of the investigation.  See infra 






much-needed cooperation in law enforcement.223  In a time when 
Arab and Muslim communities might be of assistance in 
investigating terrorism, they are being rounded up, humiliated, 
and discouraged from cooperating with law enforcement by fear of 
arrest, detention, and deportation.   
 
                     
223 See David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and 







Ultimately, this mass dragnet suggests to all persons of 
Arab and Muslim ancestry in the United States, including U.S. 
citizens, that they are less than full members of U.S. society.224 
 The various efforts by the U.S. government, even while claiming 
that it is not discriminating against Arabs or Muslims,225 
                     
224 See Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the 
Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047 (1994) 
(considering membership rights of aliens in national community); 
Michael Scaperlanda, Partial Membership: Aliens and the 
Constitutional Community, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707 (1996) (analyzing 
partial membership rights accorded noncitizens in United 
States); see also Linda Kelly, Defying Membership: The Evolving 
Role of Immigration Jurisprudence, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 185 (1998) 
(studying application of membership paradigm to recent 
immigration law developments).  See generally KARST, supra note 
__ (discussing efforts of various minorities to achieve full 
membership in U.S. society). 
225 See President Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of 






marginalize them.  Consequently, the legal measures taken by the 
federal government reinforce deeply-held negative stereotypes 
(i.e., that they are foreign and possibly disloyal to the United 
States) about Arabs and Muslims.226 
 
2. Visa Processing and Removals 
 
                                                                  
Attacks of September 11 (Sept. 20, 2001), 37 COMP. PRES. DOCS. 
1347, 1348 (2001 (emphasizing that war on terrorism was not a war 
on Muslim people). 
226 Cf. Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from 
Discriminatory Treatment by the National Government, 1977 SUP. 
CT. REV. 275, 327 (analyzing stigmatizing impact of racial 
exclusions on federal immigration law on persons sharing that 






Some of the September 11 airplane hijackers had entered the 
country on student nonimmigrant visas but never attended 
school.227  As one response, the State Department slowed its 
issuance of visas to persons seeking entry from Arab nations.228  
Such conduct is wholly within the hands of the Executive Branch. 
 In recent years, Congress has extended greater discretion to the 
State Department in visa processing and, according to some 
critics, increased the potential for nationality-based 
discrimination in the visa issuance process.229  Moreover, the 
merits of visa decisions by State Department consular officers 
long have been immune from any judicial review.230 
 
In November 2001, the INS announced its first mass arrest of 
nonimmigrant students who had violated the terms of their visas; 
the arrests were exclusively of students from nations with 
alleged terrorist links, Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Libya, Saudi 
                     
227 See infra text accompanying notes __.  However, one 
alleged co-conspirator in the hijackings apparently was denied a 
visa four times and never was able to enter the country to 
participate in the hijackings.  See Kate Zrnike & James Risen, 
Tracing a 16-Month Infusion of Men and Money, Culminating in the 
Horror of Sept. 11, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at B7.  
228 See Neil A. Lewis & Christopher Marquis, Larger Visa 
Waits for Arabs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2001, at A1; Matthew Purdy, 
Bushs New Rules to Fight Terror Transform the Landscape, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 25, 2001, at 1A. 
229 See William L. Pham, Comment, Section 633 of IIRIRA: 
Immunizing Discrimination in Immigrant Visa Processing, 45 UCLA 
L. REV. 1461 (1998) (reviewing change in 1996 immigration reform 
law).  The 1996 amendment was a response to the decision in Legal 
Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Department of State, 
45 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that State Department had 
engaged in nationality-based discrimination against Vietnamese 
asylum-seekers in violation of immigration laws), vacated and 
remanded, 519 U.S. 1 (1996). 
230 See Pena v. Kissinger, 409 F. Supp. 1182 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976); Hermina Sague v. United States, 416 F. Supp. 217 (D. P.R. 
1976).  For analysis and suggested reform, see James A.R. 
Nafziger, Review of Visa Denials by Consular Officers, 66 WASH. 






Arabia, Afghanistan, and Yemen.231  Additional scrutiny of visa 
applications from certain nations with large Arab and Muslim 
populations, as well as possible nationality-based reporting and 
related requirements for immigrants and nonimmigrants in the 
United States, like those seen in response to the Iranian hostage 
crisis,232 could be on the horizon.  Such measures might be 
authorized by law,233 with any selective enforcement claims facing 
formidable legal barriers.234 
 
                     
231 See James Sterngold with Diana Jean Schemo, 10 Arrested 
in Visa Cases in San Diego, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2001, at B1.  
232 See supra text accompanying notes ___. 
233 See supra text accompanying notes ___. 






Along similar lines, the Justice Department has announced 
that it will focus removal efforts on 6,000 young men from the 
Middle East who were subject to deportation orders.235  Although 
the enforcement of removal orders is based on nationality, such 




The Arab and Muslim dragnet was not the most extreme option 
considered in the wake of September 11.  Indeed, the tenor of the 
public debate allowed for consideration of policy alternatives 
that previously would have been virtually unthinkable.  Torture 
to extract information, or the threat of sending a suspect to a 
country that engaged in torture, was discussed as a policy 
option.237  A public re-evaluation of the ordinary Fourth 
                     
235 See DOJ Focusing on Removal of 6,000 Men from Al Qaeda 
Haven Countries, 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES 115 (Jan. 21, 2002); Dan 
Eggen & Cheryl W. Thompson, U.S. Seeks Thousands of Deportees, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2002, at A1.  
236 See supra text accompanying notes ___. 






Amendment prohibition of such practices238 ensued.  
 
Torture was contemplated because many of the material 
witnesses arrested and detained in the dragnet in the weeks 
following September 11239 did not provide information to the U.S. 
government.  Given the indiscriminate nature of the arrests,240 
many in all likelihood did not have any relevant information.  
Nonetheless, support for torture came from across the political 
spectrum, including from persons known as advocates of civil 
liberties.241    
                     
238 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (holding 
that search that shocked the conscience violated the Fourth 
Amendment). 
239 See supra text accompanying notes ___. 
240 See supra text accompanying notes ___. 
241 See Jonathan Alter, Time to Think About Torture, 






                                                                  
professor Alan Dershowitz to effect that, if torture is to be 






Torture unquestionably is an extreme measure, going well 
beyond the conventional law enforcement techniques of arrest, 
detention, and interrogation.  The consideration of extreme 
measures reveals the popular perception about Muslim 
terrorists.242  As Professor Porras observed,  
 
[t]he terrorist is transformed through the . . . rhetoric 
from an ordinary deviant into a frightening, foreign, 
barbaric beast at the same time that extra-normal means are 
called for to fight terrorism.  Since terrorists are never 
imagined as anything other than terrifying, blood-thirsty 
barbarians, ordinary law is understood to be deficient or 
insufficient to deal with them.243 
 
This classification of Arabs and Muslims as inhuman others taps 
into a long history of nativism and the view that foreigners are 
presumptively disloyal and dangerous to the security of the 
United States.244 
 
The legal use of torture hopefully will never come to pass 
                     
242 See supra text accompanying notes __. 
243 Ileana M. Porras, On Terrorism: Reflections on Violence 
and the Outlaw, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 119, 121; cf. Kevin R. Johnson,  
Aliens" and the U.S. Immigration Laws:  The Social and Legal 
Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263 (1996-
97) (analyzing how use of term alien in immigration law de-
humanizes noncitizens and helps to rationalize their harsh 
treatment). 
244 See supra text accompanying notes ___ (discussing 






in the United States.  However, the fact that it was discussed in 
polite company in the wake of September 11 demonstrates the 
monumental  although perhaps temporary  shift in public opinion 
about the need to protect civil liberties.  At a minimum, the 
serious discussion of torture broadened the spectrum of policy 




The federal government acted quickly and nationally in 
responding to the events of September 11.  The law enforcement 
tactics generally were based on group probabilities, not 
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing or knowledge.  A discrete 
and insular minority suffered the consequences, with little 
negative public reaction and general public support for the U.S. 
governments response. 
 
2. Long Term Civil Rights Impacts 
 
The federal government's reaction to the events of September 
11, promise to have deep and enduring civil rights impacts.  As 
the not-so-distant past demonstrates, immigration reforms and 
executive action, which have the appearance of responding to the 
acts of terrorism, will remain with us and adversely affect the 
rights of all immigrants and many citizens.245  Moreover, more 
fundamental immigration reform proposals, namely the possible 
regularization of the immigration status of many undocumented 
immigrants in the United States and repeal of special secret 
evidence procedures, under serious discussion before September 11 
may well go by the wayside.246  The demise of regularization 
proposals will maintain the uncertain legal status, and 
accompanying vulnerability, of undocumented immigrants living on 
the periphery of U.S. social life.247 
                     
245 See infra text accompanying notes __.  
246 See infra text accompanying notes __. 
247 See Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the 
Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor Protection and the Need for 
Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345 (2001) (contending that 
federal labor law fails to adequately protect undocumented 
workers); Maria L. Ontiveros, Forging Our Identity: 
Transformative Resistance in the Areas of Work, Class, and the 
Law, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1057 (2000) (analyzing efforts of 






                                                                  
and social life); see also Linda S. Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187: 
Undocumented Immigrants and the National Imagination, 28 CONN. L. 
REV. 555, 576-77 (1996) ([W]hile [the undocumented] formally are 
afforded the minimum rights of personhood under the law, they lie 
entirely outside the laws protections for many purposes, and 
they live subject to the fear of deportation at virtually all 
times.) (citations omitted); Jorge A. Vargas, U.S. Border Patrol 
Abuses, Undocumented Mexican Workers, and International Human 
Rights, 2 SAN DIEGO INTL L.J. 1 (2001) (discussing human rights 







Moreover, the focus on "Arab appearance" and Muslim identity 
has revived debate about the propriety of race profiling in law 
enforcement, an enduring problem for racial minorities in the 
United States.248  Before September 11, the U.S. public and 
policy-makers had come a long way in a relatively short time in 
critically scrutinizing the use of race and perceived racial 
appearance in criminal and immigration law enforcement.  One day 
promised to change all of that. 
 
1. Recent History: Oklahoma City and Immigration 
Reform 
 
The leeway afforded the federal government in immigration 
matters249 allows the political branches to swiftly take 
aggressive actions and appear to offer a quick fix to deeply 
complex political, economic, and social problems.  Immigration 
reform will likely be one of the impacts of September 11.  Recent 
history offers a helpful, if not comforting, lessons in this 
regard.   
 
                     
248 See infra text accompanying notes __. 






In 1996, Congress passed tough immigration legislation in 
response to the fear of terrorism in the wake of the Oklahoma 
City bombing; the reforms created special removal proceedings for 
alleged terrorists.250  This and other aspects of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act adversely affected 
the Arab and Muslim community,251 as well as other noncitizens in 
the United States.252  Congress enacted such drastic measures 
despite the fact that a former U.S. army officer and U.S. citizen 
was the primary perpetrator of the Oklahoma City bombing.253 
 
The Antiterrorism Act arguably did little to quell the 
threat of terrorism in the United States.254  However, it and 
other 1996 immigration reform legislation, limited judicial 
review of various deportation decisions, and adversely affected 
noncitizens in other ways.255  Only in 2001 did the Supreme Court 
                     
250 See AEDPA, supra note __; supra text accompanying notes 
__ (discussing AEDPAs provisions).  For discussion of the severe 
impacts of the 1996 immigration reforms on immigrants, see Nancy 
Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due 
Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97 (1998); Nancy Morawetz, 
Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the 
Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936 (2000); 
infra note __ (citing authorities). 
251 See Whidden, supra note __; supra text accompanying 
notes __. 
252 See infra text accompanying notes __. 
253 See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 
1998).  Despite the fact that Arabs and Muslims had nothing to do 
with the bombing, hate crimes and threats against Arabs and 
Muslims increased substantially after the bombing; in addition, 
the initial stages of the criminal investigation that followed 
focused on Arabs.  See Whidden, supra note __, at 2863-65. 
254 See Note, Blown Away? The Bill of Rights After Oklahoma 
City, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2074 (1996).  Domestic terrorists continue 
to pose a serious threat to public safety in the United States.  
See Whidden, supra note __, at 2853-60.  
255 See Jennifer A. Beall, Are We Only Burning Witches?  
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996's 
Answer to Terrorism, 73 IND. L.J. 693 (1998); Lisa A. Solbakken, 






clarify a conflict among the circuits and ensure that habeas 
corpus review of removal orders remained intact.256 
 
                                                                  
Immigration Legislation Veiled in an Anti-Terrorism Pretext, 63 
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1381 (1997); see also Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (amending immigration laws in variety of 
ways to the detriment of immigrants). 






As occurred in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, 
immigration reforms will likely be one response to September 11. 
Proposed bills designed to better monitor nonimmigrants who enter 
the country on student visas, respond to the fact that several of 
the terrorists involved in the September 11 hijackings had 
entered the country on such visas and never attended school.257 In 
addition, public opinion polls suggest that voters may support 
                     
257 See Diana Jean Schemo, Eager for Foreign Students, 
Universities Persuade Senator to Drop Plan to Limit Visas, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2001, at 1B.  Initially, Senator Diane Feinstein 
proposed a moratorium on all student visas.  See Diana Jean 
Schemo, Access to U.S. Courses Is Under Scrutiny in Aftermath of 






immigration, civil rights, and other restrictions aimed at Arabs 
and Muslims, including U.S. citizens.258    
                     
258 See Richard Morin & Claude Deane, Most Americans Back 
U.S. Tactics: Poll Finds Little Worry Over Rights, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 29, 2001, at A1 (reporting poll results showing broad 
support for Bush administration measures to combat terrorism with 
little concern for loss of civil rights); USA Today/CNN/Gallup 
Poll Results, Sept. 16, 2001 (showing that almost 50% of persons 
polled supported a special identification card for Arabs, 
including U.S. citizens, and that almost 60% favored more 
intensive security checks before Arabs could board airplanes).  
The publics willingness to sacrifice civil liberties remained 
strong well after September 11, see Robin Tower & Janet Elder, 
Public is Wary But Supportive on Rights Curbs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
12, 2001, at A1 (reporting on poll data), with President Bushs 
approval ratings at all-time highs, see Andrew Kohut, Will Bush 
Bring the Party With Him?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at sec. 4, 
p. 17 (George W. Bush has set the modern presidential record for 
stratospheric approval ratings - only Franklin Roosevelt and 
Harry Truman had longer runs of nearly universal public 






                                                                  
audience heckled a speaker off the stage after she spoke on the 
need for vigilance in protecting civil liberties in the response 
to terrorism.  See Timothy Egan, In Sacramento, A Publishers 







Congress already has taken an initial cut at the immigration 
laws.  Section 411 of the USA PATRIOT Act expands the definition 
of terrorist activity in the immigration laws that may justify 
the finding that may justify the findings that a noncitizen is 
inadmissible to include a threat to use, or the use of, any 
dangerous device, with intent to endanger, directly or 
indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to cause 
substantial damage to property; this likely will result in an 
additional removal ground for aliens convicted of simple assault 
and similar crimes not ordinarily thought of as terrorist in 
nature.259  The Act further provides that a spouse or child of a 
terrorist who is also inadmissible generally is inadmissible.260 
 A noncitizen also may be deemed inadmissible for being 
associated with a terrorist organization, whose broad terms 
seem to build on the principle of guilt by association.261  The 
Act provides for retroactive application of the various changes 
to the immigration laws.262  Congress also included appropriations 
funds for increased border enforcement, even though there was no 
evidence that the alleged terrorists evaded inspection at the 
national borders.263       
                     
259 See USA PATRIOT Act, supra note __,  411 (amending  
212(a)(3) (inadmissibility grounds) and 237(a)(4)(B) (removal 
grounds) of INA). 
260 See USA PATRIOT Act, supra note __,  411 (amending  
212(a)(3) of INA). 
261 See USA PATRIOT Act, supra note __,  411 (amending  
212(a)(3) of INA). 
262 See USA PATRIOT Act, supra note __,  411 (amending  
212(a)(3) (inadmissibility grounds) and 237(a)(4)(B) (removal 
grounds) of INA). 
263 See USA PATRIOT Act, supra note __,  402 (authorizing 
appropriations necessary to triple the Border Patrol personnel 
along northern border).  This provision responds to fears that 
terrorists might seek to enter the country from Canada, and the 
arrest, and later conviction, of an Algerian man with bomb-making 
materials seeking to enter the United States from Canada on the 
eve of the new millennium.  See Jane Fritsch, Algerian Sentenced 
in 1999 Plot to Bomb Airport, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at A26; 
Sam Howe Verhovek with Tim Weiner, Man Seized with Bomb Parts at 
Border Spurs U.S. Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1999, at A1.  The 






                                                                  
myopic focus from the southern border with Mexico, which was the 
primary place of heightened border enforcement in the 1990s.  See 
Bill Ong Hing, The Dark Side of Operation Gatekeeper, 7 U.C. 
DAVIS. J. INTL L. & POLY (forthcoming 2001) (analyzing human 







In addition, the Aviation and Transportation Act, which 
placed airport security in the hands of the federal government, 
made U.S. citizenship a qualification for airport security 
personnel.264  Although possibly constitutional,265 the citizenship 
requirement injures many lawful immigrants who had held these 
low-wage jobs.266  Somewhat ironically, while immigrants can be 
                     
264 Pub. L. No. 107-71  111(a)(2)(A)(ii), 115 Stat. 597, 
____ (2001). 
265 See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) 
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (refusing to find 
unconstitutional state law barring aliens from employment as 
public school teachers); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) 
(upholding state law requirement that citizenship requirements 






                                                                 
266 See Steven Greenhouse, Groups Seek to Lift Ban on 
Foreign Screeners, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at B10 (reporting 
that 80% of the security screeners at San Francisco International 
Airport and 40% of those at Los Angeles International are 
immigrants facing loss of their jobs); see also Sam Skolnik, INS 
Checking Sea-Tac Workers, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 28, 2001, 






conscripted into the military,267 they cannot serve in airport 
security positions. 
 
                                                                  
reviewing immigration status of Seattle airports 18,000 workers 
because of security concerns). 
267 See 50 U.S.C. app.  453 (1994); see also Charles E. 
Roh, Jr. & Frank K. Upham, The Status of Aliens Under United 
States Draft Laws, 13 HARV. J. INTL L. 501 (1972).  It is 
noteworthy that President Ford issued an order limiting federal 
service positions to citizens, see 41 Fed. Reg. 37303 (1976), 
after the Supreme Court had invalidated a Civil Service 
Commission rule to that effect, see Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 






More generally, the events of September 11 likely will 
adversely impact long contemplated reforms to immigration law and 
enforcement, with likely impacts on people of color.  Before the 
bombings, immigrant rights advocates believed it possible that 
Congress would ameliorate some of the harsh provisions of the 
1996 immigration legislation, including possible elimination of 
the secret evidence proceedings.268  Indeed, during the 2000 
Presidential campaign, George W. Bush claimed that the Clinton 
administrations use of secret evidence proceedings against Arabs 
and Muslims amounted to unlawful racial profiling.269  The 
abolition of secret evidence proceedings currently appears out of 
the question. 
 
Over the last few years, immigration rights activists had 
mobilized support of a coalition of groups for a series of 
immigration reforms to Fix 96," a response to the harsh 
consequences of the 1996 immigration reforms.270  All such 
                     
268 See Secret Evidence Repeal Act, H.R. 2121, 106th Cong., 
2d Sess. (2000); Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
4, 2000; supra text accompanying notes ___ (discussing secret 
evidence cases). 
269 See Vice President Gore and Governor Bush Participate 
in Second Presidential Debate, FDCH POL. TRANSCRIPTS, Oct. 11, 
2000. 
270 See Somini Sengupta, The Immigration Debate: Full 






legislative proposals probably died on that day.   
 
                                                                  
(discussing Fix 96 Campaign and various immigration reform 
efforts); Eric Lipton, As More are Deported, a 96 Law Faces 
Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1999, at A1 (same); see also PETER 
H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS (1998) (referring to 
1996 reforms as radical and that Congress severely restricted 






Moreover, a short-lived historical moment appeared in early 
2001 promising a fundamental transformation of U.S./Mexico 
migration.  Only days before September 11, public discussion had 
been ongoing about the possibility of dramatic changes to the 
migration relationship between the two nations.  The Mexican 
government supported a program that would allow for the 
regularization of the immigration status of many undocumented 
Mexican migrants in the United States,271 while the Bush 
administration pushed for a temporary work program.272  Although 
difficult sticking points remained,273 a compromise appeared 
possible.  After September 11, such reform discussion virtually 
disappeared, perhaps another casualty of the catastrophic events 
of that day.274 
 
Regularizing migration from Mexico promised to make the 
issue of undocumented immigration more manageable for the United 
States.  Mexican citizens represent a significant portion of the 
population.275  Thus, undocumented workers will remain in the 
shadows of U.S. social life.  Mexican immigrants also may 
experience the ripple effects of the heightened border 
enforcement.276  Only time will tell whether a historic 
                     
271 See Ginger Thompson, U.S. and Mexico to Open Talks on 
Freer Migration of Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2001, at A1. 
272 See id. 
273 See Eric Schmitt, No Agreement Yet With Mexico on 
Immigration Plan, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2001, at A1 
(quoting Senator Phil Gramm, who supported guest worker program 
but vowed that any legalization program would have to be passed 
`over my cold, dead political body). 
274 See Ronald Brownstein, Green Light, Red Light; Is the 
Push to Liberalize Immigration Policy a Casualty of the Surprise 
Terrorist Attacks on September 11?, AM. PROSPECT, Nov. 19, 2001, 
at 28; Tim Weiner & Ginger Thompson, Mexico Lower on Bushs List 
Since Sept. 11, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2001, at A4. 
275 See U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, 1998 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE 
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 240 (2000) (Table I) (compiling 
statistical data showing that, as of 1996, about 54% of 
undocumented immigrant population was of Mexican origin). 
276 See Fox Butterfield, Drug Seizures Have Surged at the 






opportunity to reform the migration relations between the United 
States and Mexico was destroyed with the World Trade Center.  
 
2. Race Profiling 
 
                                                                  
(noting impacts of increased border enforcement after September 
11); Richard Serrano, Arrests on Border Fall After 9/11, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2002, at A1 (reporting fewer arrests on border 







In the last few years, the use of race profiling in criminal 
law enforcement previously had undergone sustained attack.277  
Presidential hopefuls had criticized race profiling by police in 
traffic stops.278  After the 2000 election, both President Bush 
and Attorney General Ashcroft publically condemned race 
profiling.279 
 
Similarly, the argument had been powerfully made that race-
based enforcement of the immigration laws is inappropriate.280  
                     
277 See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic 
Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425 (1997); Harris, supra note __. 
278 See Richard L. Berke, Gore and Bradley Duel, Briefly on 
Race Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 200, at A20. 
279 See Attorney General Seeks End to Racial Profiling, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2001, at A20.  Previously, as a presidential 
candidate, George Bush had claimed that the Clinton 
Administrations use of secret evidence proceedings against 
Muslim immigrants amounted to racial profiling.  See supra text 
accompanying notes __. 
280 See Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling 






Although the Supreme Court condoned the practice in 1975,281 one 
court of appeals in 2000 held that the Border Patrol could not 
consider a persons Hispanic appearance in making an 
immigration stop.282  The profile was over-inclusive, pulling in 
too many U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents and 
subjecting them to civil rights deprivations, as well as allowing 
for the arrest of a small number of undocumented immigrants. 
 
                     
281 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-
87 (1975). 
282 See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122 






Moreover, sustained public criticism of race profiling in 
national security matters came in the wake of the Wen Ho Lee 
debacle in which trumped up espionage charges evaporated when 
exposed to the light of day.283  This case is instructive with 
respect to the current situation of Arabs and Muslims in the 
United States, in part because Lee was presumed to be disloyal 
because of long held stereotypes about Asians.284   
 
In all of these circumstances, law enforcement based on 
alleged group propensities runs afoul of the U.S. Constitution, 
which is generally premised on the view that individualized 
suspicion is necessary for stops.285  Unfortunately, governmental 
reliance on statistical probabilities at the core of the 
                     
283 See Neil Gotanda, Comparative Racialization: Racial 
Profiling and the Case of Wen Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1689 
(2000); WU, supra note __, at 176-90. 
284 See Leti Volpp, Obnoxious to Their Very Nature: Asian 
Americans and Constitutional Citizenship, 8 ASIAN L.J. 71, 79-82 
(2001); Thomas W. Joo, What, If Not Race, Tagged Lee?, L.A. TIMES, 
Aug. 15, 2001, at part 2, p. 13.  






opposition to racial profiling, have been resurrected by the 
September 11 terrorist attacks. 
 
After the tragedy of September 11, persons of apparent Arab 
ancestry were questioned for possible links to terrorism, removed 
from airplanes, and generally subject to extra scrutiny at every 
turn.286  To many, the reconsideration of the use of race in law 
enforcement made perfect sense.  Public opinion, at least for a 
time, quickly shifted to favor race profiling in the war on 
terrorism.287  If the shift proves enduring, it could have long 
term impacts, including encouraging reconsideration of the 
efforts to end race profiling in all law enforcement. 
 
The federal governments profiling of Arabs and Muslims in 
the investigation promotes the legitimacy of race profiling.288  
It also has undermined federal efforts to pressure state and 
local law enforcement agencies to end the practice.  One member 
                     
286 See supra text accompanying notes __. 
287 See Sam Howe Verhovek, Americans Give in to Race 
Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2001, at A1; see, e.g., Profiles 
in Timidy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2002, at A18 (endorsing race 
profiling in war on terrorism); James Q. Wilson & Heather R. 
Higgins, Profiles in Courage, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2002, at A12 
(same); Stuart Taylor Jr., The Case for Using Racial Profiling at 
the Airports, NATL J., Sept. 22, 2001 (advocating race profiling 
of Arab appearing people on airplanes); Bruce Fein, A 
Commensurate Response, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2001, at A17 
(advocating many measures, such as revoking executive order 
prohibiting U.S. assassinations of foreign leaders, and calling 
for President Bush and Congress to authorize race and religious 
profiling in efforts to investigate international terrorism).  As 
profiling becomes commonplace, one might think that terrorists 
might try to have terrorists who did not fit the Arab 
stereotype.  Cf. Johnson, supra note __, at 711 (making similar 
point with respect to race profiling along the U.S./Mexican 
border).  It appears that profiling may not be all that 
successful; in flying from France to the United States, one 
Muslim convert with explosives in his shoes was able to board a 
domestic flight despite heightened security.  See Sebastian 
Rotella & Marjorie Miller, Terrorists are Difficult to Profile, 
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2001, at A1.   






of Congress proclaimed that anyone with a diaper on his head and 
a fan belt around that diaper should be stopped and 
questioned.289  A Republican member of Congress of Lebanese 
descent (Darrell Issa) accused Air France of race profiling in 
denying him a seat on a flight to Europe.290  An Arab American 
Secret Service agent assigned to protect President Bush was 
denied access to an American Airlines flight.291 
 
                     
289 See Apology from Congressman, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 
2001, at A16. 
290 See Rep. Issa Says His Arab Name Kept Him Off Flight, 
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2001, at A1; see also Rosenzweig, supra note 
__ (reporting on indictment of two Jewish Defense League leaders 
for conspiracy to blow up Issas congressional office). 
291 See Guard for Bush Isnt Allowed Aboard Flight, N.Y. 






Interestingly, state and federal tensions have arisen due to 
the federal governments racial profiling in the wake of 
September 11.  Several local law enforcement agencies resisted 
the Attorney Generals request for cooperation in interviewing 
Arabs and Muslims292 in hopes of uncovering information about the 
bombings on the grounds that this constituted impermissible 
racial profiling.293  In addition, the Attorney General also 
requested that the U.S. government should be informed if an 
interviewee was suspected of being in the country in violation of 
the immigration laws.294  This, of course, would discourage 
immigrant cooperation with the police and make local law 
enforcement more difficult.295 
**** 
In short, the U.S. governments response to the loss of life 
of September 11 promises to have long term immigration and civil 
rights impacts.  The impacts may well be felt by citizens as well 
as immigrants of many different ancestries.  Unfortunately, this 




The stereotyping of Arabs and Muslims historically has had a 
dramatic impact on immigration law and policy.  Separate 
procedures and the selective enforcement of the immigration laws 
has adversely affected the civil rights of Arabs and Muslims in 
                     
292 See supra text accompanying notes ___. 
293 See Fox Butterfield, Police are Split on Questioning of 
Mideast Men, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2001, at A1; Jim Adams, Twin 
Cities Police Undecided on Helping FBI, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, 
MN), Nov. 22, 2001, at 7B.  Some resistance stems from local laws 
and regulations limiting police cooperation with the INS, which 
were designed to encourage crime victims and witnessed to 
cooperate with local law enforcement.  See, e.g., Patrick J. 
McDonnell, INS Hunt Not Seen as Issue for LAPD, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 
8, 2001, at Part 2, p.4 (discussing 1979 Los Angeles Police 
Department directive barring officers from inquiring about 
immigration status). 
294 See supra text accompanying notes ____. 
295 See supra text accompanying notes ___. 






the United States.  The most recent war on terrorism has built 
on previous anti-terrorist measures.  Sadly but not unexpectedly, 
private discrimination frequently has accompanied governmental 
action directed at Arabs and Muslims.  
 
The federal governments response to the events of September 
11 reveals much about the relationship between immigration and 
civil rights.  The federal government responded with a vengeance, 
in a national fashion focusing on Arab and Muslim noncitizens 
across the country.  With few legal constraints, and the public 
willing to sacrifice civil liberties of Arab and Muslims in the 
name of national security, the federal government pursued harsh 
means with little resistance. 
 
The events of September 11 reveal the limited membership 
rights accorded persons of Arab and Muslim ancestry in the United 
States, U.S. citizens as well as immigrants.  Such treatment has 
been suffered by various groups in this nation's history.  Many 
of those groups, such as African Americans, Asian Americans, and 
Latinos, continue to strive for full membership in this society. 
 Only time will tell whether Arab and Muslim Americans will ever 
achieve that goal, or perhaps which group will replace them as 
the demons of tomorrow. 
